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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This paper argues that the interactive problem-solving workshops created by political 
scientist John Burton and applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by social psychologist 
Herbert Kelman, while not, as yet, resulting in a just and permanent peace agreement, are 
effective in resolving intractable conflict, and, if persistently used, can significantly help to 
produce such an agreement. This is done by closely examining two books of Burton and a series 
of articles by Kelman to describe their process; the characteristics of intractable conflict are also 
reviewed from the work of social psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal. It is then argued that the 
psychological elements of intractable conflict and the satisfaction of basic human needs are 
addressed in the interactive problem-solving workshops, exactly what is needed in intractable 
conflict. It is also suggested that the many outsider recommendations for the resolution of this 
conflict will not work because they do nothing to address the psychological elements. 
 Recommendations are made to use the workshops to resolve disputes between the Hamas 
and Fatah political parties and various elements on the Israel side of the conflict; the top leaders 
of both sides of the conflict are also urged to participate in a workshop.  
 This paper also notes that a fully completed peace agreement already exists in the form of 
the Geneva Initiative, assembled by Israeli and Palestinian persons exhibiting the qualities 
promoted by the workshops.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
There are many conflicts in our daily lives; indeed, conflict is a necessary part of life. No 
two people look at all things in exactly the same way; being physically separate beings presents 
the possibility of seeing things differently, and having different life experiences assures different 
views on subjects. Conflict, therefore, is a constant companion and not in itself a bad thing; it can 
serve to help us understand the world better by considering other perspectives.  
Like many things, conflict can be looked upon as being on a continuum. Two simple 
qualities of conflict might be time and complexity. In regard to time, at one extreme it can be 
short-lived and at the other extreme it can last for years, even decades; the latter are often 
labelled protracted. In regard to complexity, at one extreme it can be simple or at the other 
extreme it can be complicated with factors that seem irresolvable; the latter type is usually called 
intractable, and, by nature, is protracted as well. Our focus will be on this intractable conflict.  
Bar-Tal describes intractable conflict as a term that has found some consensus among 
scholars in a basic form: “All of them agreed that these types of conflicts are resistant to peaceful 
resolution and therefore last a long time, as none of the parties involved in them can win or is 
willing to compromise order to reach in a peaceful settlement. They thus constitute a special type 
of conflict that is difficult to resolve” (Bar-Tal 2013, 36).  
This form of conflict is usually also violent. Unfortunately, there exist today many such 
conflicts among nations and communal groups. Examples are the Kashmir conflict between India 
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and Pakistan (both of which possess nuclear weapons); the conflict between the Kurds and the 
Turks; the conflict between Chechnya and Russia; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—all 
involving grievances over independence and autonomy. In the current era, we could add to the 
list of intractable conflict any “terrorist” conflict, such as those involving Al Qaeda or the 
Islamic State, because none of the adversaries seems willing to resolve it except by deadly force.  
Generally, our purpose will be to explain a method with which intractable conflict may 
be resolved or at least moderated. We will describe the development of this method, then look 
into how this method has been practiced in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since that conflict 
continues to resist resolution, we will decide if the method should continue to be practiced there.  
Our objectives, therefore, will be: (1) to explain the conflict resolution method created by 
John Burton; (2) to review the results of its application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus far 
by Herbert Kelman; and (3) to evaluate this conflict resolution method for the purpose of 
determining whether it is productive to continue its use in this conflict.  
Our method will be to examine two major books written by Burton; examine various 
articles written by Kelman; and briefly review Bar-Tal’s book on intractable conflict.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
An approach to resolve deep-rooted or intractable conflicts has been created by the late 
Professor John Burton. It is designed as a pre-negotiation method, that is, it is to be used prior to 
the start of negotiations. We will begin the description of this method with some biographical 
information about Burton and then review the history of his development of the method.  
Burton’s Early Attempts to Analyze International Conflict 
Introduction to Burton  
Professor John Wear Burton (1915-2010) was born in Melbourne, Australia, the son of 
the Reverend John Wear Burton, a radical Methodist minister. He graduated in psychology from 
the University of Sydney in 1937, and began his career as an appointee to a junior position at 
Australia House in London. Later he completed his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics. 
He returned to Australia and worked in various governmental departments, eventually becoming 
departmental secretary to the Minister of Department of External Affairs. Burton represented 
Australia at significant international meetings, including the United Nations Charter Conference 
in 1945, and the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. At age 32, in 1947, he was named the youngest 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs. He generated some controversy when he argued 
for the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China following its establishment in November, 
1949. He later ran as a Labor candidate in the 1949 general election, but was defeated. He 
resigned from government, but in 1951, was appointed as Australian High Commissioner to 
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Ceylon. He resigned from this appointment to run again for the Labor party in the general 
election, but lost again.  
Burton joined academia from 1955 to 1963 as lecturer in international relations at the 
Australian National University, where, in 1960, he assumed a fellowship in the Research School 
of Pacific Studies. During this time, he wrote his book, Peace Theory, which was later 
considered to have initiated the field of peace studies. In 1962, he obtained a grant to study 
conflict and its resolution in Africa and Asia by the Rockefeller Foundation.  
From 1963 to 1978, he was lecturer in international relations at University College, 
London, during which time he wrote International Relations: A General Theory. Also during this 
period, he founded both the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict and the International Peace 
Research Association, and wrote two more books, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules and 
Conflict and Communication. In 1978, he moved to the University of Kent where he established 
another Centre for the Analysis of Conflict and served as its director from 1978 to 1982.  
He then moved to the U.S., joining the University of Maryland where he founded the 
Conflict Resolution Project of the Center for International Development, and served as its 
director from 1982 to 1985. Then in 1985, he was appointed Distinguished Visiting Professor of 
Conflict Resolution at the Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason 
University in Fairfax, Virginia. In 1989, he was named Distinguished Jennings Randolph Fellow 
at the United States Institute of Peace. Later he retired from George Mason University and 
returned to Australia, while maintaining a program of lecturing and writing. In 1997, he was 
regarded by the Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution as “one of the most important scholars in 
the conflict resolution field today.” (http://scar.gmu.edu/Burton_career_summary.html. Accessed 
12-15-16.)  
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Early Research Program  
In 1969, while at University College London, Burton published his book, Conflict and 
Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations. He says that 
this book describes his findings from a research program in international and communal conflict. 
It will be used here to describe how Burton developed his method.  
The research program arose out of a belief that then-current historical and other 
descriptive documents regarding conflicts could not adequately provide answers to many of the 
questions being asked about conflict. He believed that these questions could “be answered only 
by analyzing perceptions and misperceptions, interactions and features of state decision-making, 
which are best observed when the parties in conflict are in an interacting situation” (Burton 1969, 
x).  
Invitations  
In October 1965, Burton and his colleagues devised an experimental program to remedy 
the situation. Invitations were sent to three governments involved in a conflict, stating that an 
academic endeavor was planned in which discussions with political and social scientists would 
seek to define pertinent problems, and the governments were asked to participate. It was made 
clear that the purpose was not to settle the conflict, but to provide research data and enhance 
communication so as to possibly benefit all sides in areas such as “problems of race, the 
influence of great powers, consequences of underdevelopment,” and other such areas (Burton 
1969, 4).  
The invitation stirred enough curiosity that all three governments accepted. In December 
1965, the governments’ representatives met with a Burton-established panel of scholars in 
London. Burton says “The government nominees were senior officials attached to London 
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diplomatic missions and other persons nominated by responsible Ministers” (Burton 1969, 4). 
The panel of scholars acted as a third party to facilitate discussion. In preparation for the 
conference, the scholars had visited the countries involved, studied their problems, and prepared 
a set of propositions and hypotheses that were related to current relevant social theories. It was 
hoped that discussions would help to test the validity of these hypotheses and propositions about 
the nature of conflict: “The scholars included two political scientists professionally engaged in 
the study of international relations, three social psychologists, two industrial relations specialists, 
an international lawyer, a regional historian, and a chairman with long experience in the conduct 
of small meetings” (Burton 1969, 5). 
Secrecy 
A rule was established to hold the discussions in secret. Nothing was made public at the 
time. Burton does not identify the governments or their nominees because of this rule. (Later 
publications identified them as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.) The purpose of this rule 
was to prevent media or other public pressure on the governments and any speculation or rumor 
as to what the governments might concede in the conflict. But, as Burton says, even if the fact of 
the discussions were discovered, “no great damage could be done since governments were 
merely cooperating in an academic exercise” (Burton 1969, 57).  
In addition, no recordings of these discussions were officially kept presumably to avoid 
leaks. All participants could take notes; the scholars needed them to assist in their theoretical 
work, and the participants needed them to report back to their political superiors (Burton 1969, 
231-232). 
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Choice of Participants 
It was expected that the participants would be fully knowledgeable about the views of 
their political leaders and could fully defend them. Other key qualities desired among 
participants were their ability to analyze a situation and possess an attitude of flexibility. 
Flexibility, says Burton, was desired because it is not usually found in political leaders, so they 
were not chosen to participate at this point: “Politicians who have personally declared their 
positions, and whose reactions and perceptions are being analyzed, would tend to be rigid and to 
act defensively” (Burton 1969, 42).  
Participants could, however, be lower-level officials who did not have major policy-
making power but had access to those who did. Participants could also be academics who were 
well-versed in their government’s policies and stances on the issues. While they were expected 
to be open-minded, they were not to be seen as easily swayed; if so, they would not be effective 
in conveying ideas to major decision-makers (Burton 1969, 43).  
Surprisingly, Burton says that even extremists were welcome, seemingly contradicting 
his desire for flexibility. He says that “persons are required who tend … to be committed to more 
extreme attitudes. An official or person who does not identify emotionally with the values of the 
party he represents is not helpful: the underlying issues are not brought to the surface by an 
apologist, or by a disinterested person” (Burton 1969, 43). Presumably, he hoped to change 
attitudes so that “an atmosphere can be produced, by various means of control …, that enables 
participants to treat the conflict, not as a contest, but as a problem to be solved” (Burton 1969, 
42). 
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Discussion Process 
Even though this process was a pre-negotiation process, there was the expected amount 
of tension when the parties first faced each other. But the academic atmosphere helped to ease it 
somewhat, and the parties had agreed to sit together to analyze a problem. To ease the tension, an 
introductory exposition was given by a third-party panel member about the nature of the planned 
discussion and the ways in which social science had developed theories regarding conflict 
(Burton 1969, 66, 71). 
After this, the parties were invited to describe the conflict as they saw it, wholly 
uninhibited by diplomatic or other conventions, as is possible in an academic setting. Official 
presentations by each side followed, with the expected accusations and counter-accusations. 
Very little of this provided new information. After these expositions were complete, which 
usually took at least the first day, questions were asked by panel members and by the parties 
(Burton, 1969, 68). The control of the discussion was accomplished by interventions of members 
of the third-party panel. Eventually there emerged “a highly sophisticated seminar discussion as 
might take place among experienced staff members of an interdisciplinary university 
department” (Burton 1969, 67). 
During discussions, it was observed that certain things were happening: participants 
“became less tied to formal positions, admissions were made that motivations were mixed, fears 
not usually expressed were explained and reasons given for them, and generally the background 
conditions of conflict, internal and external, came to be revealed” (Burton 1969, 6). After a while 
Burton says that the “fact of the conflict receded into the background as the problem to be solved 
was more clearly defined. Alternative means of attaining the same objectives without the costs of 
conflict and by various means of cooperation were finally discussed” (Burton 1969, 7).  
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Perceptions 
In this environment, the modification of perceptions obviously plays a large role. The 
discussion focused on perceptions and how they can be faulty. Perceptions are important because 
they lead to judgements and judgments lead to attitudes and attitudes lead to further perceptions: 
“Parties …  have usually experienced many years of conflict and their selections from past 
history and their moral judgments justify, confirm and reinforce their attitudes” (Burton 1969, 
73). Unless an observer understands the background of a phenomenon, judgments can be faulty. 
An example given by Burton is that: “Most people can make no sense of the policies, attitudes 
and responses of a foreign state, but once knowledge is available patterns emerge” (Burton 1969, 
74). Participants were made aware that, in this regard, “all evidence must be tested by some 
means to ensure that it is being correctly interpreted” (Burton 1969, 83). 
Analysis 
In addition to the focus on perceptions, analysis of conflict is a major element in the 
process. It is stressed to counter the parties’ expectancy that they are required to bargain and 
negotiate: “Parties to conflict are so accustomed . . . to a negotiating framework, that they act on 
the assumption that in their discussions, one side will gain and another will lose. To control this, 
it is useful to stress that analysis is not concerned with examining the merits of alternative 
solutions. A resolution of conflict may be suggested as the result of analysis; but it is far more 
likely that altered perceptions and attitudes will lead to solutions quite different from those 
contemplated by any party.” An outcome is possible that both sides accept: “On the contrary, 
controlled communication … assumes that analysis will reveal, after perceptions are corrected, 
that neither side may be required to compromise, and that solutions will be found by which all 
gain” (Burton 1969, 70). 
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In this process, then, the parties begin to see that perceptions affect conflict, and analysis 
not only helps to understand why something happened, but aids in discussion of what can be 
done (Burton 1969, 72). Analysis also helps the parties to estimate the costs of their actions in 
the economic and political aspects, which can be significant. All this helps to turn the discussion 
away from a contest of one against the other to a common problem needing solution. This is the 
process of what Burton calls controlled communication.  
Controlled Communication 
Burton describes controlled communication as “a technique by which political and social 
scientists exercised control of discussions between representatives of nations and states that were 
involved in conflict.” The key hypothesis of the technique is that “the conflict behavior of 
communities and states comprises alterable components such as perception of external 
conditions, selection of goals from many possible values, choice of different means of attaining 
goals, and assessments of values and means in relation to assessments of costs of conflict” 
(Burton 1969, ix). 
The parties come to the discussion conditioned to a mindset complete with ideologies, 
attitudes, and positions. Burton says that certain psychological methods are needed to change 
those mindsets. This is the core of the controlled communication process. It is akin to the work 
of a social worker: “The strategies of control seem to be those of the clinical psychoanalyst, the 
caseworker, the industrial psychologist and the family counsellor…. The client is usually 
maladjusted in some way. It might seem a far cry from casework to resolution of conflict 
between states; states are not maladjusted individuals, and the representatives of states are 
invariably intelligent, aware and highly informed persons. Yet the experience of casework, and 
the ‘supportive’ approach of the caseworker, are most relevant …” (Burton 1969, 68). 
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Techniques that work with individuals can also work with groups in keeping focus on the 
issues. These include those that are “used for lessening tension in the interviewee; for bringing or 
keeping the interviewee to the main issue; for helping the interviewee to make difficult 
admissions; for breaking defense mechanisms; for influencing the judgment of the interviewee.” 
The proper techniques used skillfully can broaden the minds of the participants: “Clarifications, 
the promotion of insights into the position of each party by the other, correction of perceptions, 
explanations of international processes of interaction, all require the techniques, skills and 
experience of the caseworker” (Burton 1969, 69).  
The process, therefore, requires some psychological knowledge: “Psychoanalysis, 
psychotherapy, group therapy and resolution of conflict … all have much in common; they all 
involve professional relationships, and invite the same kinds of professional behavioral patterns” 
(Burton 1969, 69).  
With all the psychology involved here, the inclusion of psychologists on the third-party 
panel is a practical necessity. 
Role of the Third-Party Panel 
In the traditional practice of peace settlement, the third party, usually a mediator, can help 
clear up misunderstandings, reduce emotional levels, balance somewhat any power imbalances, 
and encourage alternative viewpoints for consideration (Burton 1969, 61). These are all 
important functions of the mediator. But in Burton’s method, the role of the third-party panel is 
somewhat different: “The third party … is there to explain conflict, its origins, its escalation, 
sometimes by reference to other conflicts, sometimes by analytical means, but within the context 
of a continuing discussion between the parties” (Burton 1969, 61-62). 
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The difference between traditional third-party roles and that of Burton’s arises out of a 
difference in objective. While traditional methods seek compromise and settlement, the third-
party panel “endeavors to establish a condition in which the parties see their relationships as 
posing a problem to be solved.” The objective is not to place blame: “Both sides are assumed to 
have been acting in ways which appear to them … to be in their best interests. Neither is more 
right nor wrong than the other.” The focus is on the problem, not the personalities: “Even if an 
aggressive initiative has been wholly with one side, even if there appears to have been a blatant 
case of unprovoked aggression, there is still a problem: the apparent aggression was stimulated 
by some circumstances … The role of the third party [panel] is to establish a condition in which 
all parties join with it in defining, identifying and solving the problem” (Burton 1969, 62). 
Members of the third-party panel bring their knowledge and experience to the service of 
the protagonists; they “have worked in the fields of conflict, including the related areas of 
decision-making, perception, deterrence, escalation, functionalism, and the very many other 
aspects that are now the subject of empirical research” (Burton 1969, 63). Their expertise is used 
to help the sides understand that their situation is not unique and to understand also that their 
behaviors result from conflict. This helps “in making the exercise a problem-solving one rather 
than a contest” (Burton 1969, 71).  
The third-party panel refrains from making moral or other kinds of judgments, making it 
clear at the beginning that: “contemporary social science has moved away from the normative 
approaches of religion and law, in which behavior is designated as right or wrong …; analysis of 
conflict is analysis of behavioral responses to circumstances, of possible alternative responses, of 
possible false perceptions, and the behavior of the parties is not being judged at any stage” 
(Burton 1969, 69-70).  
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Ultimately, it is not the third-party panel but the participants who originate the resolution; 
it cannot come from outsiders: “There are psychological reasons why resolution of a conflict 
must come from the parties themselves …” It is only they, Burton says, who “can point to the 
relevant issues as they perceive them: the conflict is at least in part a perceived relationship, and 
only the parties can describe and explain some aspects of it” (Burton 1969, 63). 
Communication to Principals 
Any criticism of the process that says that the participants, not being top decision-makers, 
will not possess the sense of responsibility that elected top officials have is mitigated by the 
requirement of sending periodic reports back to superiors. The superiors will, obviously, evaluate 
the validity of any ideas and suggestions generated. So the process levies a heavy obligation on 
the participants. This is to convey ideas, concepts, values, and re-perceptions to their superiors. 
And in the end, the representative “is required to transmit a revised attitude, to point out sources 
of misperception, and evidence of irrelevant response to persons who have not had his 
experience of direct communication” (Burton 1969, 45). The representative must possess the 
ability to convince his principals to accept and internalize these changes.  
Burton admits that this might not always happen: “The altered perception of the person 
around the table cannot always be conveyed to others who have not had the experience of the 
discussions. In these circumstances the exercise may have to be performed again in ways which 
involve the final decision-makers” (Burton 1969, 232). This statement points out a possibility 
that may be appropriate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—to be discussed below.  
Finally, there are two conveyances that need to occur. The first is that between 
representative and decision-maker. The second is between decision-maker and the people. 
Burton says that the second requires different strategies because it “raises problems of leadership 
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and the use of mass media” (Burton 1969, 214). Convincing the people to support great changes 
might not be possible, but getting them to consider and accept incremental changes might be 
easier, as well as considering objectives and goals not previously discussed (Burton 1969, 215).  
In line with these statements, Burton then makes a somewhat contradictory 
announcement: “Controlled communication, because it sets out to help to discover possible new 
directions, does not necessarily require that the perception and value changes that take place 
among people around the table must also take place within the governments and communities in 
conflict” (Burton 1969, 215). He seems to be saying that it is sufficient for the top leadership to 
incorporate new ideas and implement them. Otherwise, the reader is led to believe that Burton is 
satisfied with the planting of the seeds in the protagonists in the hope that they will bear fruit 
through time. This result, it seems, is dependent upon the partisan political control of the 
communities involved. If opponents to this process of transformation prevail, the length of time 
for the seeds to bear fruit could be much longer.  
Second Group  
The program was tried again in 1966, when two parties involved in an internal communal 
conflict that had gained international concern were invited to participate. Each representative 
was nominated by the leaders of a party involved in the conflict. Again, Burton does not mention 
the parties to the conflict, but it was later revealed that it was the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
Burton (1969, 8) does mention three scholars who participated on the panel, one of whom was 
Professor Herbert C. Kelman, social psychologist then at the University of Michigan (later at 
Harvard). Kelman subsequently worked to bring the program into the Middle East and to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. This will be discussed below.   
15 
 
Burton relates that in this second conference, even though the level of hostility was 
higher than in the first, the general course of discussion was similar. He says that it was helpful 
that the general knowledge of the third-party panel of scholars was greater than in the first 
meeting. Still, it took almost 24 hours to establish control of communication (Burton 1969, 11).   
During this session, Burton (1969, 11) observes: “Misperceptions, false interpretations of 
official statements, prejudice between national groups, unrealistic expectations about the policies 
of other states, and many other such relevant causes of misunderstanding and inaccurate 
calculation were revealed.” He says that it was necessary and “possible to bring to bear with 
greater effect than in the previous exercise research findings on conflict, conflict escalation and 
conflict resolution.”  
Results of the Program  
Improved Communication 
With the parties actively involved in the process of analyzing the conflict, knowledge was 
gained that suggested the means for resolving it in ways that represented a departure from 
traditional practices. Burton says that “the experience suggested that an important technique 
might have been evolved, as it were by accident, for the avoidance of conflict, and for the 
resolution of conflict even during violence, because the parties themselves seemed to gain … in 
some ways not possible from more traditional procedures of conciliation, arbitration and 
negotiation. Thus, the method came to have a second objective—the resolution of conflict” 
(Burton 1969, x-xi). 
One of the most important lessons that Burton says was learned during this pilot project 
was that “in analysis and in resolution of conflict it was communication between the parties that 
was instructive and effective. The [panel of] scholars had an important role in injecting new 
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information, and in other ways helping the parties to stand back from their conflict so as to see it 
as a problem to be solved; but it was the controlled communication of the parties that was 
valuable” (Burton, 1969, 7). Burton, therefore, calls this process “controlled communication” 
because of the importance of that element of the process.  
Testing of Method Inconclusive 
Burton seems to back off when it comes time to assess whether his hypotheses were 
confirmed and whether any success was achieved in the actual resolution of conflict. But at the 
time of publication, 1969, the experiment was very new and he says that further practice was 
needed before any conclusions could be made (Burton 1969, 216-217). 
Burton is honest enough to admit that the validity of his method is put into doubt when he 
cannot point to cases where conflict was resolved among the parties involved in his experiment. 
However, it does seem plausible when he claims that change did occur: “All that can be said is 
that communication was established where previously it did not exist, perception and attitudes of 
participants altered during the exercise, and events followed, some of which could have been 
directly or indirectly related, but which could have been due no less to many other influences 
that were operating on the parties simultaneously” (Burton 1969, 216-217). To confirm validity, 
therefore, would mean controlling for a variety of factors requiring extensive follow-up. 
Burton suggests a high probability of success because of results in other fields that have 
used similar techniques, such as education, social work, and industrial relations. He states that 
“what is being studied are the consequences of learning by the parties themselves” (Burton 1969, 
225). With an environment created to produce learning, it seems plausible that among intelligent 
participants, learning did occur. 
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Other Burton Observations  
After arranging and operating these conferences, Burton could make some observations 
about the parties involved, and he shared some of them.  
Internal Disunity 
One of the points that Burton shares from these discussions is that it is common to have a 
division within each side on how the conflict should be resolved. No assumption, therefore, 
should be made that the parties are a monolithic whole in their goals, values, or strategy. 
Naturally, when violence starts and there is a threat to the group, the factions will come together 
to face the threat. But usually states are not unified internally. In fact, some governments express 
interests that do not represent the majority of their citizens, and thus lose what he calls 
“sociological legitimacy” as compared to legal legitimacy. Internal disunity can even result in 
escalation of conflict combined with attempts to blame the enemy for internal economic or 
political problems (Burton 1969, 20). One of the benefits of controlled communication, Burton 
says, is that, since it is a face-to-face discussion, it forces parties to clarify their own thinking and 
solve their own problems before there can be intra-party agreement (Burton 1969, 23).  
Reasons Given for Not Participating 
Some governments chose not to participate in Burton’s program for a variety of reasons. 
One such reason was what Burton calls a “constitutional” reason given for not participating. This 
relates to the political recognition of the other party, and usually involves communities rather 
than states. Insisting on legally legitimized status while ignoring “sociologically legitimized” 
status prevents communication. The real problem, he says, is not constitutional but relational. In 
controlled communications, the constitutional status of parties is irrelevant: “The parties to 
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communication must be those who are in fact in conflict, and it is not always or even mostly that 
these are governments” (Burton 1969, 124). 
In some conflicts where larger states had intervened, there was a reluctance on the part of 
the states to give a reason for not participating. Burton surmises that his process “provides for a 
searching analysis of motivations and interests, and the intervention of foreign states in a local 
conflict cannot readily be justified in terms usually employed in official public statements” 
(Burton 1969, 122).  
Another pertinent reason was that “practitioners in powerful states have difficulty in 
believing that their knowledge and perceptions might be faulty, or that their conflicts are not 
wholly due to the behavior of the less responsible smaller powers” (Burton 1969, 121). A simple 
case of egoism it appears. 
Closely associated and a more common reason for not participating was the “resistance of 
professionals and traditionalists who take the view that matters of international politics are of no 
concern to anyone except the states involved. Traditional attitudes act as a resistance to 
cooperation with the United Nations, and they provide an even greater resistance to interventions 
by unofficial third parties” (Burton 1969, 121).  
This last type of resistance is especially seen in regard to negotiations. Burton observes 
that the traditional means of peaceful settlement of conflict fall short when dealing with 
international conflict. States are not willing to concede settlement power to third parties such as 
international agencies or judicial authorities because they “remove the ultimate power of 
decision from states, and . . . this is usually unacceptable to states. Not only is the power of 
decision removed; it is transferred to an authority whose responses cannot reliably be forecast 
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and whose guide-lines are far from clear …” (Burton 1969, 150-151). The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict presents a good example of this. 
Summary 
In this book, Burton describes how his experiment in international relations led to 
developing a method of helping to resolve intractable conflicts. Representatives of governments 
involved in conflict were brought together under the guidance of an expert third-party panel, 
which used factual information, knowledge of conflict, and controlled communication to lead the 
participants into examining their perceptions, analyzing their conflict, and in the process 
changing attitudes, so that together they generated ideas toward resolution. In this pre-
negotiation process, the representatives conveyed what they learned to their political leaders, 
who would then engage in detailed negotiations. This process of bringing together 
representatives from both sides who are not official negotiators became known as the “Track 
Two” process. The Track One process is one used between diplomats and other officials.  
From Controlled Communication to Conflict Resolution  
Introduction 
In his book, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, published in 1990, Burton modifies his 
approach. While controlled communication is still emphasized with its objectives of changing 
erroneous perceptions, analyzing the conflict, and costing the conflict, Burton now refers to the 
process as “conflict resolution.” He still focuses on the problem-solving aspect, and the third-
party panel is still critical. What is new to the method is his addition of a theory of human needs 
that not only provides a guide to the problem-solving process, but also acts as an overall standard 
to pursue in all intractable conflict resolution processes. It also helps to eliminate the danger of 
an agreement that is not sociologically legitimate.  
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The two major concerns are the same: the first is to explain conflict, and the second is to 
find a way to resolve it. He differentiates between what might be called ordinary, day-to-day 
conflict and deep-rooted intractable conflict. Resolving the latter type of conflict is quite 
different from that of the former (Burton 1990, 2). 
The theory of human needs comes as the result of Burton’s integration of the works of 
psychologist Abraham Maslow and sociologist Paul Sites. Burton calls the result a unified theory 
of human behavior that he applies to intractable conflict. He works to justify the validity and 
importance of this theory to counter any criticism that it might be seen as promoting a certain 
value judgment. Finally, to benefit from the insights learned from the practice of conflict 
resolution, Burton suggests a new process which he calls “provention,” which he describes as 
“the promotion of an environment conducive to harmonious relationships” (Burton 1990, 2). 
Traditional Views of Conflict  
Prevailing Views and the Nature of Man  
Burton says that the traditional and prevailing view of conflict is that it can be deterred or 
contained “provided sufficient coercion is employed” (Burton 1990, 13). Underlying this view is 
the concept of traditional power theorists that human behavior is motivated mainly by material 
benefits, and the source of conflict is competition for scarce resources (Burton 1990, 46). 
Just as there is the theoretical construct of the “economic man” to fit the requirements of 
an economic theory, there is also a political-social-psychological construct to fit the political 
system. It envisions a person who is aggressive by nature or as a consequence of his desire to 
compete for and acquire scarce resources. This construct deals with evil, sin, and maladjusted 
personalities; the evil person justifies the use of authoritative power—from the parent to the 
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state—assuming that only power can control inherently anti-social human behaviors (Burton 
1990, 30-31).  
This traditional view includes the notion that socialization should be used to control 
individuals. The individual is expected to adjust to society and his “betters.” He exists to serve 
society, and society has no obligations to serve in the development of the individual. This 
traditional view treats all types of conflict similarly (Burton 1990, 31-32).  
Deep-Rooted Conflict  
However, many serious conflicts are not amenable to this approach. In serious types of 
conflicts, there are present some concerns and frustrations that are not easily negotiated away, 
adjudicated by the courts, or repressed through the use of power. If power is used to contain this 
kind of conflict, it can provoke future conflict (Burton 1990, 13-14).  
This is deep-rooted conflict that includes cases “that arise out of demands on individuals 
to make certain adjustments in behavior that are unacceptable [to the individuals], and probably 
beyond human tolerance and capabilities …” (Burton 1990, 15). Symptoms of such deep-rooted 
conflict are terrorism, hostage-taking, ethnic violence, gang warfare, public protest movements, 
and “other forms of intractable opposition to authorities at one social level or another” (Burton 
1990, 15). These cases “require an analysis of the total situation and an appropriate remedy, 
rather than merely the containment of dissident behaviors.” They may even “require alterations 
in norms, institutions and policies to bring adjustment within the range of human acceptability 
and capability” (Burton 1990, 15). It is these types of cases for which, Burton says, conflict 
resolution is designed.  
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The New Paradigm of Conflict  
In the study of conflict, “the main problem area is the finding of an adequate explanation 
of conflict from which to deduce remedies, and by which to avoid policies that could lead to 
dysfunctional outcomes …” The traditional means of settling disputes and conflicts “attaches 
importance to the preservation of institutions, to the socialization of the individual into certain 
behaviors, to the role of power in relationships, and to the application of elite norms” (Burton 
1990, 27).  
Burton’s theory of conflict provides a stark contrast: “Conflict resolution … processes are 
not pragmatic responses to situations, but are deduced from a generic theory of conflict.” They 
are based upon a different view of the nature of man and are “found in theories of behavior that 
were developed in response to empirical evidence of crucial failures in public policies … The 
issue at stake is which or what theoretical framework is valid” (Burton 1990, 27).  
Human Needs Theory and Conflict 
Introduction  
Burton says that recent insights from different disciplines and practical experience have 
conflated to where we can see the beginning of a ‘theory of human behavior that argues that the 
human being, …  has certain needs that are basic, that are not malleable, that must be satisfied if 
there is to be individual development leading to conforming behavior” (Burton 1990, 33). These 
human needs are such that, if the socialization process is not compatible with them, frustrations 
will result, leading to anti-social behaviors. “Parents, teachers, societies … have probably never 
fully appreciated that there are human needs more compelling … than any possible external 
influences, and that these are easily frustrated by environments, sometimes seemingly caring 
family and social environments, that deny opportunities for development.” Even authority and 
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raw power are not enough to overcome these internal forces. “Deterrence theory, the basis of 
domestic enforcement and international strategic policies, is undermined because deterrence 
cannot deter in conditions in which human needs are frustrated” (Burton 1990, 33-34).  
Human needs theory is not new to psychology. Deckers relates that needs were 
recognized early in the life of the science and seen as related to drives: “Whereas drive was often 
viewed as the result of deprivation of some incentive, need was considered to be an inherent 
characteristic of humans.” He mentions the work of Georges Le Roy (1764), who postulated “the 
existence of the need for food, clothing, shelter, love, external stimulation, and rest.” Later, 
psychologist Henry Murray (1938) “formalized the study of needs and concluded that they are a 
major source of human motivation.” Besides the “primary needs, or viscerogenic needs,” there 
are secondary needs, or “psychogenic needs, [which] are concerned with mental or emotional 
satisfaction and depend on or are derived from primary needs.” These needs will produce organic 
effects: “Once instigated, a need will persist as an electrical chemical process in the brain, which 
corresponds to a feeling of desire…. Needs can be evoked by an internal physiological process 
but also by environmental demands, which are either to be approached or avoided. To illustrate: 
a person’s need for affiliation is brought on by the presence of other people and causes him to 
seek out individuals to be with” (Deckers 2010, 33). 
Modern Contributions 
Maslow 
This early work in the theory of human needs was extended by psychologist Abraham 
Maslow (1908-1970) who theorized a hierarchy of human needs. Burton credits the work of 
Maslow and sociologist Paul Sites for their seminal work: “The emergence of such studies of 
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human behavior that cut across separate disciplines was a prerequisite to the development of 
conflict resolution” (Burton 1990, 102).  
Maslow postulated five broad categories of basic needs, which he says are part of human 
nature and could be universal to mankind. Most fundamental and of the highest priority are the 
physiological needs consisting of food, water, shelter, and those needs without which a human 
could not physically survive. These needs are the highest in priority in human motivation. When 
a man is starving, for example, all his attention and capabilities are focused on finding food 
(Maslow 1987, 17).  
Once these needs are reasonably satisfied, new needs emerge in the form of safety needs. 
These include “security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety and chaos; 
need for structure, order, law, and limits; strength in the protector; and so on” (Maslow 1987, 
18). To see examples of these need deprivations in real life, “we must turn to neurotic or near-
neurotic individuals, and to the economic and social underdogs, or else to social chaos, 
revolution, or breakdown of authority” (Maslow 1987, 18). When safety needs are thwarted, “A 
common, almost an expectable reaction, is the easier acceptance of dictatorship or of military 
rule” (Maslow 1987, 19). 
Once the physiological and safety needs are reasonably satisfied, a category of needs 
emerges having to do with love, affection, and belonginess. If these needs are unsatisfied, “a 
person will feel keenly the absence of friends, mate, or children…. Now the pangs of loneliness, 
ostracism, rejection, friendlessness, and rootlessness are preeminent.” Maslow advises that: “Any 
good society must satisfy this need, one way or another, if it is to survive and be healthy” 
(Maslow 1987, 20). He also observes: “In our society the thwarting of these needs is the most 
25 
 
commonly found core in cases of maladjustment and more severe pathology” (Maslow 1987, 
21). 
The next set of needs to emerge after prior needs are satisfied are the esteem needs. These 
are expressed in individuals as a “desire for a stable, firmly based, usually high evaluation of 
themselves, for self-respect or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others.” Again, Maslow warns 
that the “thwarting of these needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness, and of 
helplessness. These feelings in turn give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory 
or neurotic needs” (Maslow 1987, 21).  
If all prior needs are satisfied, the last of the emerging category of needs are the so-called 
self-actualization needs. These needs focus on what the individual should be doing, “what he or 
she, individually, is fitted for. Musicians must make music, artists must paint, poets must write if 
they are to be ultimately at peace with themselves. What humans can be, they must be.” This is 
the level where individual differences are greatest, because satisfaction will vary from person to 
person (Maslow 1987, 22).  
In addition to these basic human needs, Maslow sees certain preconditions that must be 
present for needs to be satisfied. These preconditions include “freedom to speak, freedom to do 
what one wishes as long as no harm is done to others, freedom to express oneself, freedom to 
investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend oneself, justice, fairness, honesty, and 
orderliness in the group …” Maslow also notes their importance: “Danger to these freedoms is 
reacted to with emergency response as if there were direct danger to the basic needs themselves” 
(Maslow 1987, 22-23).  
Maslow emphasizes the danger of denying basic human needs: “Thwarting of 
unimportant desires produces no psychopathological results; thwarting of basic important needs 
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does produce such results…. A conflict or a frustration is not necessarily pathogenic. It becomes 
so only when it threatens or thwarts the basic needs or partial needs that are closely related to the 
basic needs” (Maslow 1987, 30).  
It might be noted that while Burton refers to the concept of human needs as a theory of 
human behavior, Maslow saw the theory of human needs as a theory of human motivation, 
which he regarded as one aspect of human behavior. Burton could presumably agree that human 
needs were but one aspect of human behavior, but they were, by far, the most significant. 
Sites 
Burton also incorporates the work of sociologist Paul Sites (1926-2010), whose pertinent 
ideas are found in his book, Control: The Basis of Social Order. He finds that Sites’ work 
parallels that of Maslow in that it argues that “given the opportunity, an individual will attempt, 
against all odds, to be in control in matters of human importance” (Burton 1990, 92). 
Sites proposes eight needs in the individual: the needs for response, security, recognition, 
stimulation, distributive justice, meaning, to be seen as rational, and a need to control (Sites 
1973, 43). Burton says that his initial proposition argues that the concept of self power is 
indispensable: “if individuals and groups attempt to control their environment, there must be a 
reason.” That reason, he says, “is to obtain gratification of needs, including the need for 
survival.” These needs are “universal and genetically inherent in the individual. They are 
ontological” (Burton 1990, 96).  
Sites also reinforces what Maslow says when needs are not met: “the individual who is 
exposed to a high degree of inconsistency in response may develop schizophrenia. Other forms 
of psychosis can many times be traced to the early socialization process filled with 
inconsistency. These ‘illnesses’ may occur in any situation where the individual is not able to 
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control the situation from what he sees as a rational, i.e., means-ends consistency, point of view” 
(Sites 1973, 42).  
The needs of the individual are carried forward to the group: “If we can assume that 
members of a group are concerned with such things as group survival and goal attainment over 
time, there should be little disagreement concerning the necessity of the group’s controlling or at 
least attempting to control the conditions which make these things possible. This being the case, 
the necessity of a control orientation on the part of a group becomes self-evident” (Sites 1973, 
72).  
In controlling their situation, groups will relate to other groups depending upon their 
various control orientations. “In one situation the most workable control orientation for one 
group might be cooperation with another group …, while in another situation the most workable 
control orientation might be the attempted destruction of another group or perhaps the co-option 
of some of the leaders or members of other groups” (Sites 1973, 72). In control theory, then, 
groups with a culture or history of violence may resort to it when problems are not initially 
solved; as Sites suggests: “war can best be understood within the framework of control theory, 
since war, by definition, is an attempt by one society to exert control over another society 
through the use of raw force” (Sites 1973, 166). 
In summarizing the work of Sites, Burton says: “The insight that control theory provides 
is that external constraints, decisions taken by others, are not effective in controlling behaviors 
when human needs are denied” (Burton 1990, 92). He adds that recognition of the importance of 
human needs is inferred in the work of others: “Many scholars who did not adopt a needs 
approach consciously, yet rested on it by implication.” For example, in 1970, T. R. Gurr 
published a popular book with the title Why Men Rebel. Burton says Gurr “was referring to all 
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people, at all times, in all societies, with a strong implication that there are some basic human 
needs to be fulfilled” (Burton 1990, 94).  
Justifying Human Needs Theory  
Burton sees an alignment between social science and the physical sciences in searching for 
hidden reasons for things: “Behavioral science is, in these circumstances, no different from 
natural science. Both have universality, both are governed by empirically observable patterns of 
behavior, both require at some level of analysis hypotheses concerning the unobservable reasons 
for overt behavior, and these require experiment and testing” (Burton 1990, 94). 
The way that non-observable behavior and needs must be specified is deductive. For 
example, “if learning and social development require consistency in response, security, identity, 
and recognition, and if human behavior is characterized by learning and social development, then 
humans pursue consistency in response, security, identity, and recognition as a condition of their 
learning process” (Burton 1990, 95). It is reasonable to argue that organisms have a genetic drive 
to learn, for their existence depends upon it. These learning needs must be fulfilled: “If 
recognition, identity of self, and some measure of control over the environment are human needs, 
then the absence of their fulfillment will lead to adaptations that restrict development and 
perhaps create abnormalities in behavior or lead to anti-social behaviors” (Burton 1990, 95).  
The force of these needs, reinforced by anthropological and other studies, is many times 
stronger than the influence of outside forces: “The individual’s most fundamental drive is to 
attempt to control his environment in order to meet his needs.” If needs cannot be met by being 
honest, the individual tries something else. Sites’ control theory, Burton says, can be called needs 
theory because control theory “demonstrates how aggression can be created by circumstances, 
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thus pointing to the long-term costs and consequences of needs deprivation” (Burton 1990, 96-
97). 
Deprivation frequently leads to overreaction. “A person (or a communal group), deprived 
of rewarding relationships, recognition, or security and identity over long periods, will tend to 
have a chip on their shoulder, to perceive injustice and deprivation and to be aggressive even in 
circumstances that do not require it.” This condition creates a certain inclination: “Totalitarian 
and political and social leadership roles tend to attract such individuals. Or there may develop a 
personal paranoia that attracts persons to intelligence services directed toward possible enemies” 
(Burton 1990, 97). 
Burton says that the theory of human needs can yield some important insights. It explains 
why, for example, a minority of Catholics in Northern Ireland could not be controlled by the 
army, nor could the conflicts in Cyprus, Sri Lanka, the USSR, and many others. A majority 
government in a society divided by ethnicity may become repressive if it does not allow for the 
satisfaction of the identity need of the minority. The theory explains why city gangs seek 
recognition, valued relationships, and opportunities for development in a society that allows 
them to receive less opportunities than other members of society. Burton thinks that women, 
because of the way they have been treated historically, have a better understanding of human 
needs theory and the consequences of denial of need fulfillment (Burton 1990, 33).  
Human Needs and Conflict Resolution  
Burton’s method of conflict resolution is, therefore, inherently tied to the theory of 
human needs. It provides a scientifically sound basis for the building of agreements. But in 
resolving conflict through the process of controlled communication, where the only relevant 
reality is that of the participants, presumably questions can arise as to whether the conflict was 
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resolved justly. Burton has recognized that in many instances the protagonists do not represent 
the majority of their constituents. This fact suggests that the agreement, if completed without the 
consideration of human needs, could benefit only an elite segment of a society. This could result 
in an agreement that eventually causes an uprising among the majority. To preclude this from 
happening, the theory of human needs provides a goal for a just and permanent solution.  
Distinguishing Between Needs, Values, and Interests  
In putting the theory into practice, Burton says: “It is reasonable to assume that human 
motivations include some that are required for the development of the human species, some that 
are culturally specific, and some that are of a transitory nature …” (Burton 1990, 36). To 
differentiate between these forms of motivation, Burton labels them respectively, needs, values, 
and interests. 
Needs reflect universal motivations and are integral parts of the human being. Besides the 
biological needs of food and shelter, Maslow and Sites have argued that there are basic needs 
that relate to growth and development. They are seen in the unsatisfied needs of individuals and 
groups engaged in ethnic and identity struggles; unless satisfied, these needs will spawn behavior 
outside the legal norms of society (Burton 1990, 36). 
Values are those acquired “ideas, habits, customs, and beliefs” that are characteristic of 
social communities. They spring from “linguistic, religious, class, ethnic, or other features” 
possessed by various cultures and identity groups. “In conditions of oppression, discrimination, 
under privilege, and isolation, the defense of values is important to the needs of personal security 
and identity,” and can be confused with needs. “Preservation of values is a reason for defensive 
and aggressive behaviors” (Burton 1990, 37). 
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In contrast, he says, “Interests refer to the occupational, social, political, and economic 
aspirations” of individuals and identity groups. “They typically relate to material goods or role 
occupancy,” and can change with circumstances. They are not an inherent part of the individual 
as are needs or values (Burton 1990, 38). 
Interests are negotiable and can be traded for social gain. In contrast, needs and values, 
such as those for identity or recognition, are inherent drives and cannot be traded. Conflict 
involving needs and values can easily become deep-rooted conflict. For example, individuals 
cannot be coerced to accept majority rule that denies their ethnic or cultural identity (Burton 
1990, 39). 
The Problem-Solving Process  
Problem solving is the core technique of the conflict resolution process, and is much like 
that described in his earlier book. Burton tells us that four characteristics describe its scope. First, 
it is an ongoing process, not an end product. It establishes a new environment where new 
conflicts can arise, at which point the process is then repeated. Second, it frequently requires a 
change in conceptualization of a problem, new techniques, and a new synthesis of knowledge. 
Third, it deals with the total environment in which the conflict can affect outsiders, and outsiders 
can affect the conflict. Fourth, it addresses sources and origins of the conflict (Burton 1990, 
204). 
But within the process, its substance is personal. Burton reminds us of this when he says: 
“Let us note that the subject matter of a conflict resolution interaction is relationships, and the 
fundamentals of human behavior” (Burton 1990, 206). These fundamentals of human behavior 
are those comprised by the theory of human needs.  
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The problem-solving process begins with a review of perception in general and then an 
analysis of each side’s perceptions of the other. The third-party panel guides discussion using 
their subject matter expertise. The result is that “the reality as perceived by the protagonists may 
alter as a result of increased knowledge.” After this, the parties examine their tactics and what 
the costs and consequences of these tactics have been and could be. The parties are then in a 
position to “explore alternatives that are available once reperception and reassessment have taken 
place” (Burton 1990, 204).  
The third-party panel’s main task is to provide a “filter” to “screen out false assumptions 
and implications from existing knowledge, cultural and ideological orientations and personal 
prejudices.” If the participants use this filter, “they will be able to perceive realities accurately, 
assess available theoretical and empirical knowledge, and arrive at reliable conclusions” (Burton 
1990, 208).  
Burton argues that conflict resolution processes are not unique to any culture. There is a 
universal “human culture that favors reasoned attempts to contend with problems” (Burton 1990, 
206). Problem-solving processes involve the use of the abilities of analysis and thought common 
to the human species, and are thus cross-cultural (Burton 1990, 211). 
Burton says that this new paradigm brings with it a new challenge—to substitute analysis 
and problem solving for authoritative decision making and coercion at all social levels (Burton 
1990, 118).  
The Social Good  
Valued Relationships  
Burton says that his theory of conflict “argues that included in human needs is a 
particular need for valued relationships. This acts as a self-restraining influence on human 
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behavior. In the absence of valued relationships, there are no self-imposed restraints.” The 
effective approach for a society, therefore, is to “provide those conditions that generate valued 
relationships and … self-imposed controls” (Burton 1990, 154). 
Besides the self-control that valued relations enhance, they are a “satisfier of recognition 
and identity needs. The causes or sources of conflict between individuals and groups cannot be 
separated from the totality of relationships and the environmental conditions that promote 
relationships” (Burton 1990, 47). One might also argue that they are satisfiers of the affection 
need, since relationships are the core of friendship and intimacy. The problem, Burton says, is 
“institutional and social circumstances can deprive many people of them” (Burton 1990, 47).  
Burton is saying, therefore, that valued relationships could help prevent serious conflicts. 
Goals of Society  
Burton suggests that we ask some important questions about our society, such as: “What 
are the ultimate goals of society, of civilizations, of people that must be reflected in any 
decisions taken in respect to a particular situation?” Questions like these will ultimately lead to 
questions about our own nature: “Are we able to get down to some fundamental assumptions 
regarding the nature of the human being, such as those implied in needs theory?” (Burton 1990, 
199). Ultimately, the satisfaction of human needs provides the criteria by which to assess the 
quality not only of conflict resolution but also public policy. Burton helps us to understand that 
“there are objectively determined guides to policy, bases on which goals and policies can be 
assessed and predictions made as to success or self-defeating consequences” (Burton 1990, 97). 
This process of assessment and prediction is what Burton terms “provention.”  
The human needs framework, therefore, provides us with criteria for the common good: 
The full satisfaction of basic human needs leads to the development of the individual, and this is 
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the common good (Burton 1990, 157). Individuals who live in an environment that aids in the 
development of their potential do not need to engage in deadly conflict.  
Summary  
In this second book, it appears that Burton’s work in controlled communication showed 
him that while agreements could result using that approach, a long-lasting resolution would 
require a focus on the nature of human behavior. While the only relevant reality was that of the 
participants, this reality had to be based upon truth for any agreements to survive. If an 
agreement were based upon the interests of elite groups, further agitation could be expected. 
Modern social theories provided the basis for a new unified theory of human behavior that 
supplied greater insights into intractable conflict. Burton incorporated this new theory into his 
method to produce what he calls problem-solving conflict resolution—a method that seeks the 
satisfaction of human needs as the foundation for the resolution of intractable conflict. This 
“human dimension” cannot be adequately addressed by the traditional power framework.  
One of Burton’s early colleagues in the workshop process, social psychologist Herbert 
Kelman, became an advocate of the method, and used it for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His 
writings provide some of his observations and insights into what is needed. 
Kelman’s Contributions to Problem-Solving Workshops  
Introduction to Kelman 
Kelman was born into a Jewish family in Vienna, Austria in 1927. In 1938, Austria was 
annexed into Germany by Hitler. Shortly after this, he and his older sister joined a Zionist youth 
group, which he credits for giving him a sense of identity and self-esteem at a time when Jews 
were being mistreated. After hearing that a right-wing youth group suggested moving Arabs out 
of Palestine to make room for the Jews, he said that he thought the idea was not feasible to move 
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so many people out of their homes. So at an early age, he was sensitive to human concerns. In 
1939, his family escaped to Belgium, then later moved to the U.S. At age 18, he wrote articles on 
international issues for student publications. In one article, he presented the pros and cons of 
nationalism, and in another he spoke of the need for cooperation in Palestine between the Jewish 
and Arab peoples (Kelman 2010, 362-363). 
In the postwar years he became involved in civil rights, anti-war, and anti-nuclear 
movements, getting arrested several times. In the 1950s in Baltimore, he got involved in the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and co-founded the Baltimore chapter; after that he held an 
elected field representative position. During the Korean War he refused induction and went 
before a judge, where he was legally granted the status of a conscientious objector for the Korean 
and Vietnam drafts (Kelman 2010, 365). 
In college, he decided to major in social psychology because “it was a discipline with 
great relevance to the issues of peace, justice, and social change, with which I was concerned.” 
His earliest research, he says, “focused on processes of social influence and attitude change—
which remains a continuing interest to this day.” Another area of research interest has been group 
processes, including group psychotherapy, which foreshadows work on problem-solving 
workshops. But he points out that the workshops should not be confused with therapy or 
encounter groups: “Although my experience with the latter has influenced my practice in a 
number of ways, problem-solving workshops have a very different purpose and operate on a 
different level” (Kelman 2010, 366). 
After getting his Ph.D. in social psychology at Yale, he taught at Harvard from 1957-
1962. He was one of the early scholars involved in peace research, and in 1957, he and 
colleagues founded The Journal of Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan. This group 
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became the core group that founded that university’s Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, 
which Kelman joined when he came to Michigan to teach in 1962 (Kelman 2010, 366, 368). 
Kelman fused the study of international relations with social psychology and in 1965 
published his edited interdisciplinary work, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological 
Analysis. He believes this book “significantly contributed to my credibility among international 
relations scholars who were prepared to accept me as a legitimate member of their guild” 
(Kelman 2010, 368).  
Kelman became familiar with John Burton when Burton visited Michigan in 1966. 
Burton, who was working in London at the time and setting up his conflict workshops, invited 
Kelman to join his third-party panel for a “controlled communication” workshop with the 
participants in the Cyprus conflict. After that experience and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Kelman 
thought about applying the method to Arab-Israeli workshops, but had other responsibilities at 
the time. After moving back to Harvard in 1969 to assume the Cabot Chair in Social Ethics, he 
wrote an article, published in 1972, about the method, and used it in his social psychology 
seminars with colleague Stephen Cohen. Cohen suggested they set up a pilot workshop with 
students as members of the third-party panel. These panels turned out to be the first in a long 
series of panels conducted on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Kelman 2010, 369-370). 
Kelman says that while the workshops are based on Burton’s model, they have been 
modified to include more of a social psychological perspective. During the operation of the 
workshops, Kelman says that he learned three basic lessons:  
a) that the third party need not be neutral in the sense of disinterested, but in situations 
like mine—of a Jew dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict—it is important to work with 
an ethnically balanced team;  
(b) that—although recognizing that conflicts are almost always multilateral in a variety of 
ways—interactive problem solving is most effective in achieving its purpose when there 
are only two parties around the table; and  
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(c) that one cannot meaningfully deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without 
bringing Palestinians who are identified with the PLO into the process (just as one cannot 
do so without Israelis who identify with the Zionist enterprise) (Kelman 2010, 371).  
 
These lessons affirm Burton’s statement that those most affected by the conflict should be 
represented. 
At the end of the 1972 academic year, Kelman suffered a heart attack, and while 
recuperating, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war broke out. It was then, he says, that he decided to 
commit his efforts to conflict resolution in the Middle East as his highest priority (Kelman 2010, 
372).  
Kelman has been a prolific writer, chaired several international professional 
organizations, and been awarded numerous commendations. He is currently Richard Clarke 
Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, Harvard University 
(http://scholar.harvard.edu/hckelman/home Accessed 1-19-17). 
Kelman’s Workshops 
Kelman says he was influenced by Burton’s work and his book, Conflict & 
Communications, to continue work on his own. He organized workshops in the Middle East with 
other specialists in that area, focusing first on the Arab-Israeli conflict and then the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. A chronological review of a selection of Kelman’s many relevant writings 
will provide an overview of his process and his analyses of the conflict.  
In 1982, Kelman wrote an article entitled “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian 
Negotiations,” which appeared at a time when negotiations were at a stalemate. It was written 
well before the Oslo Accord of 1993, when the parties finally recognized each other as legitimate 
negotiating parties. In this article, Kelman says that he and colleagues had been studying the 
Arab-Israeli conflict since the early 1970s using the Burton format of workshops, which Kelman 
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came to call the “interactive problem solving” (IPS) workshops. In keeping with Burton’s rule of 
secrecy, Kelman does not mention the names of any individual participants. 
In his analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kelman recognizes several obstacles to 
negotiations, the major one being the fear that each side has of recognizing the other: their 
thinking is that if one side recognizes the other, it delegitimizes their own standing since both 
sides are fighting for the same land. This obstacle is tied to perceptions that each side sees the 
other as wanting to destroy it. The importance of perceptions is what Burton stressed in his work, 
and perceptions here create the dilemma, Kelman says.  
Kelman also recognizes the foundational importance of relationships. If negotiations are 
to succeed, they must “entail a process that helps to build mutual trust. And they must produce 
agreements to which the parties are and feel committed” (Kelman 1982, 44). Direct negotiations 
are necessary rather than as an adjunct to agreements with other Arab nations (Kelman 1982, 
72). 
In this analysis of the conflict, Kelman sees (1982, 62) the fundamental psychological 
problem to be that of each side representing a nationalist movement that requires the other side to 
recognize its national identity and legitimacy, but being unable to do the same to the other side 
because doing so would mean relinquishing their own identity and legitimate right to the same 
land. Both sides feel constraints to offer recognition but fail to see similar constraints on the 
other side. He says (1982, 63-64) both sides perceive the other side as out to destroy them in a 
zero-sum conflict. If either side’s leader were to publicly announce recognition of the other side, 
he would be seen by his constituency as “betraying the national cause.”  
A pre-negotiation problem-solving workshop is an appropriate place for parties to discuss 
recognition and other matters using “a series of successive approximations” to build good will. 
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The workshop would be facilitated, according to the established format, by the third-party panel, 
whose task was “to create the context for and facilitate the process of constructive 
communication” (Kelman 1982, 72-73).  At that time, Israeli law prohibited government contact 
with the PLO, so Israel would be represented in the workshop by private citizens; representatives 
of the Palestinians would be persons who were not PLO officials but were close to decision-
makers.  The aim of the workshop would be to explore whether there was a possibility for 
arriving at a framework for negotiations. If this proved successful, the political decision makers 
would be informed and an attempt made to gage public opinion. If a favorable political 
atmosphere seemed to exist, political leaders would then be encouraged to appoint “quasi-official 
representatives to complete the prenegotiation process” (Kelman 1982, 73). 
In a 1990 article entitled, “Applying a Human Needs Perspective to the Practice of 
Conflict Resolution: The Israeli-Palestinian Case” Kelman says that, while he believes in the 
concept of basic human needs, he doesn’t believe that they are necessarily arranged in a 
hierarchy, or that lower-ranked needs must be satisfied before higher-ranked needs. He says also 
that he doesn’t necessarily believe that thwarting of some needs will lead to deviancy. On the 
other hand, he says, “I view the large-scale frustration of basic human needs as a threat to peace 
and social order.” Regarding the universality of needs, he doesn’t think that all the needs posited 
by the various theories are universal, but “I do believe that certain basic needs are widely shared 
across cultures and societies.” (Kelman, 1990, 283) 
The workshop process, he says, can be fairly described as “an application of a human 
needs perspective to the practice of international conflict resolution.” Human needs are related to 
the workshop through its definition, its structure, and its process. The workshop is defined as “an 
effort to find—through joint, creative problem solving—solutions to the conflict that would 
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satisfy the needs of both parties.” The workshop is structured so that “the focus of conflict 
analysis and resolution is on the parties whose needs are at the core of the conflict.” And the 
workshop’s process “is specifically geared to enabling the parties to identify and understand 
each other’s needs and to take the two sets of needs simultaneously into account as they work on 
the shape of an overall solution.” (all his emphasis) (Kelman, 1990, 289) 
Kelman admits that, during negotiations, some issues may come up that are not amenable 
to a win/win solution, but many other issues are: “When parties probe beyond their stated 
positions and presumed interests into their underlying needs, they may find that these needs are 
in fact not incompatible … and that an apparently intractable conflict can in fact be resolved.” 
The third party’s role is “to encourage such probing, while recognizing that the search for a 
positive-sum solution does not inevitably meet with success.” (Kelman, 1990, 291) 
Some claims over land are zero-sum type claims, and they can only be resolved by 
compromise. But other important claims are open to resolution: “Paradoxically, focusing on the 
needs for identity and security and the existential fears associated with them may actually 
enhance the possibility of achieving conflict resolution.” He credits Burton with showing that 
ontological needs are not zero-sum in nature, so that, for example, satisfying the other’s identity 
need does thwart the satisfaction of one’s own security need; they may be complementary: 
“Thus, if Israelis can be reassured that Palestinian self-determination can be achieved without 
threatening Israeli security, and if Palestinians can be reassured that Israeli security concerns can 
be accommodated without denying political expression to Palestinian national identity, the two 
parties can move toward a historic compromise over the issues of territory and sovereignty.” 
(Kelman, 1990, 290-291) 
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Some claims over land are based on a position taken, rather than on needs. He gives an 
example in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict regarding their mutual struggles for land: “At the risk 
of oversimplifying the issues …, let us propose that the Palestinians want it primarily to establish 
and express their national identity, while the Israelis want it primarily to safeguard their national 
security. Once the conflict is redefined in terms of these underlying needs, the parties may be 
able to invent solutions that would satisfy Palestinian identity needs and Israeli security needs 
without threatening the other’s existence.” (Kelman, 1990, 295) 
In regard to human needs, he points out, as did Burton, the necessity of distinguishing 
perceived, false needs from legitimate needs, especially when one party “needs” to dominate the 
other: “When such [perceived] needs as domination or control over the other emerge in the 
course of a workshop, it is important to explore their meaning to the party expressing them. The 
third party might encourage participants to push more deeply in order to see what lies behind 
these statements of needs.” Probing into the reasons for the perceived needs may reveal insights, 
such as finding that “the need to dominate the other reflects a deeper need for identity, or that the 
need to control the other reflects a need for security. It may then be possible to redefine these 
needs and to identify different satisfiers that would provide the party the identity or security it 
seeks without negating the other’s needs in the process.” (Kelman, 1990, 291-292) 
Kelman agrees with Burton that the collective human needs of the group originate from 
the human needs of individuals: “The terms we use to describe collective needs are identical to 
those used to describe individual needs: identity, security, recognition, autonomy, dignity, 
justice, development. And, indeed, what a human needs perspective ultimately refers to is the 
needs of individuals.” These needs provide the criteria, as it did for Burton, “for evaluating 
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public policies and institutional arrangements, including those that bear on the resolution of 
international and intercommunal conflicts.” (Kelman, 1990, 296)  
Kelman suggests that the interactive problem-solving (IPS) workshops can be useful in a 
variety of ways beyond the pre-negotiation stage. They can be used during negotiations to 
provide a “non-committal forum” to discuss issues in stalemate; they can be used by parties to 
work out technical, political, or emotional issues; and they can be used in the post-negotiation 
stage to “help the parties explore patterns of coexistence and cooperative efforts and thus 
contribute to a transformation of their relationship.” (Kelman, 1990, 288)  
In his 1992 essay, “Acknowledging the Other's Nationhood: How to Create a Momentum 
for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” Kelman reports that Arab-Israeli multi-party 
negotiations had begun in the fall of 1991 in Madrid, but produced no significant progress or 
momentum. Then, in June 1992, Israeli elections were held and the Labor Party came into power 
replacing the Likud Party. Kelman saw this change as offering new hope for negotiations.  
For our purposes, three remarks by Kelman are significant in this article: 1) He describes 
how the U.S. government pressured Israel into participating in the Madrid negotiations. Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud Party saw no need to talk because he had no 
intention of making any concessions to the Palestinians. But, Kelman says, Shamir was pressured 
to participate “because Secretary of State James Baker left him no reasonable option, particularly 
after obtaining Arab agreement to the negotiations on terms that met virtually all of the Israeli 
procedural conditions.” (Kelman, 1992a, 19) This incident is an example of the U.S. using its 
power to pressure Israel into talks. 2) Kelman states that some of the negotiators from both sides 
had participated in a workshop, making them sensitive to the concerns of the other side. 
However, while many on both sides supported negotiations, Kelman says that public support was 
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not strong enough to provide the momentum needed to move forward. (Kelman, 1992a, 23) This 
point makes us aware that public support is crucial during the negotiation stage. 3) In order to 
facilitate negotiations, Kelman suggests drawing up a broad framework of principles during the 
prenegotiation process. This framework would help develop an atmosphere of trust and serve as 
a guide for the detailed negotiations. In this particular case, the framework of principles would 
recognize each side’s legitimate nationhood. By agreeing to a set of overarching principles, a 
kind of moral commitment is established: “A defining characteristic of this kind of commitment 
is an attitude of reciprocity, which implies a recognition by each party that the other, too, has 
valid moral claims—without assuming that the two sets of moral claims are of equal validity.” 
(Kelman, 1992a, 27) It should be mentioned that Kelman’s arguments and persistence in urging 
mutual recognition bore fruit in the 1993 Oslo Accord.  
In another 1992 essay, “Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner,” Kelman says 
that he has implemented a “continuing workshop” relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
where the same group of participants meets regularly. The process has several advantages: it 
allows analysis and problem solving to be focused on difficult issues; it allows the benefit of 
reviewing actions taken, thus offering a feedback and correction process; and it allows ideas to 
be considered on how to disseminate its results.  
An interesting side note is that Kelman warns that the number of scholars and 
practitioners in the world who are familiar with this process is inadequate for the work to be 
done. He recommends that principles and standards be developed. (Kelman, 1992b, 92-94) 
His 1997 article, “Group Processes in the Resolution of International Conflicts: 
Experiences from the Israeli–Palestinian Case,” was published after the signing of the Oslo 
Accords in September, 1993. Here he further elaborates on the IPS workshop approach, and 
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discusses the contributions it has made to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. With the 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the coming to power of the right-wing Likud Party, he says it 
is possible that the Oslo agreement may not reach full implementation of its 3-year phase-in 
process. He was prophetic in that regard.   
He explains how the Oslo Accord was produced by a group of Israelis and Palestinians 
working together in secret, and that the agreement incorporates a declaration of principles and 
the mutual recognition that he had long advocated. He also saw some defects in its phased-in 
approach that left the sticky problems until the last phase, the so-called “final status” 
negotiations. (Kelman, 1997, 213) 
Kelman says that he and his colleagues, including Palestinian academic Nadim Rouhana, 
had a hand in creating the atmosphere for the Oslo negotiations: “A variety of unofficial contacts 
between the two sides played a significant role in creating this sense of possibility and the 
climate conducive to negotiations. It is in this context that the third-party efforts in which my 
colleagues and I have been engaged since the early 1970s contributed to the evolving peace 
process.” (Kelman, 1997, 213) 
In a later article, however, Kelman admitted that neither he nor his teams had direct input 
to the Oslo process: “When the Oslo agreement was announced, various observers credited our 
work with having laid the groundwork for it …. I must admit that I found such observations 
gratifying and confirming, and after a while I persuaded myself that they were indeed true. Of 
course, I made it clear that my colleagues and I had no direct involvement in the prenegotiation 
and negotiation processes that produced the Oslo agreement.” (his emphasis) (Kelman, 2005, 11) 
While Kelman and his team had no direct involvement with the Oslo Accord, he sees 
three areas where his workshops have made contributions. The first of these contributions is the 
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development of cadre to engage in negotiations: “Over the years, dozens of Israelis and dozens 
of Palestinians, many of them political influentials or preinfluentials, have participated in our 
workshops and related activities, including the continuing workshop in the early 1990s.” 
(Kelman, 1997, 215)  
The second contribution is the sharing of information and new ideas that have been 
generated in the workshops over the years. These insights “included shared assumptions, mutual 
sensitivities, and new conceptions of the process and outcome of negotiations, all of which were 
developed in the course of workshop interactions.” (Kelman, 1997, 215-216) 
The third contribution was the creation of new political atmosphere, which was also 
nurtured by other interacting groups: “Our workshops, along with various other Israeli–
Palestinian meetings and projects, have done so by encouraging the development of more 
differentiated images of the enemy, of a deescalatory language and a new political discourse that 
is attentive to the other party’s concerns and constraints, of a working trust that is based on the 
conviction that both parties have a genuine interest in a peaceful solution, and of a sense of 
possibility regarding the ultimate achievement of a mutually satisfactory outcome.” (Kelman, 
1997, 216)  
Kelman says the workshop experience is also designed to ultimately produce “a coalition 
across conflict lines—as part of a process of building a coalition between those elements on each 
side that are interested in a negotiated solution …” (Kelman, 1997, 218) This provides the 
“negotiating partner” that each side says is currently lacking.  
Kelman highlights the psychological benefits that the IPS workshop provides. It offers 
insights that “are comparable to the ‘corrective emotional experiences’ that play an important 
role in individual and, particularly, group psychotherapy …” (Kelman, 1997, 217) This statement 
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is reminiscent of Burton’s description of sessions being similar to psychotherapy. The workshop 
stimulates fundamental psychological changes in resolving conflicts in that: “there are certain 
processes … such as empathy or taking the perspective of the other …, learning and insight, and 
creative problem solving—that, of necessity, take place at the level of individuals and 
interactions between individuals. These psychological processes are by no means the whole of 
conflict resolution, but they must occur somewhere in the system if there is to be movement 
toward a mutually satisfactory and stable peace.” (Kelman, 1997, 217) 
Accompanying this process of building empathy is the building of mutual trust. The 
participants “try to shape solutions that are responsive to the fundamental concerns of both sides. 
They search for ways of providing mutual reassurance.” (Kelman, 1997, 219)  
In short, the process serves to humanize each other: “Such ideas often emerge from 
acknowledgments that participants make to each other in the course of their interaction: 
acknowledgments of the other’s humanity, national identity, view of history, authentic links to 
the land, legitimate grievances, and commitment to peace…. Thus, workshop participants can … 
testify that a cooperative, mutually enhancing relationship is possible …” Ultimately, then, the 
necessary ingredient in transforming intractable conflict is the transformation of relationships, 
and this is what the workshops aim to do: “Perhaps the greatest strength of problem-solving 
workshops is their potential contribution to transforming the relationship between the conflicting 
parties.” (Kelman, 1997, 219)  
In a 2005 article, “Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case: Past 
Contributions and Present Challenges,” Kelman recaps the contributions to the Oslo process that 
he feels were aided by his team’s workshop efforts. In addition, he illustrates the effects of 
improved communications with incidents that occurred in two workshops in the 1980s:  
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The Israeli and Palestinian participants found that they were able to talk to each other, 
and developed a degree of working trust. There came a point in the course of the 
workshop when the Israelis told their Palestinian counterparts: ‘If only we could 
negotiate with reasonable people like you instead of the PLO, we would be able to find 
common ground.’ In response, the Palestinians insisted very strongly: ‘But we are the 
PLO,’ meaning that they identified with the PLO. In a subsequent session, an almost 
identical exchange took place in reverse, when the Palestinians said, in effect: ‘If only we 
could negotiate with reasonable Israelis like you, instead of the Zionists.’ And the Israelis 
replied, ‘But we are committed Zionists.’ (Kelman, 2005, 15) 
 
He also points to two recently negotiated framework agreements created by two non-
official groups in 2003. The first is a simple framework agreement called the “People’s Voice,” 
also called the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles, that suggests a two-state arrangement; 
it was created by Ami Ayalon, former Israeli navy commander and head of Shin Bet, the interior 
security agency, and Sari Nusseibeh, Palestinian President of Al-Quds University and former 
Palestinian Authority representative in Jerusalem. Kelman says that they have gathered “tens of 
thousands” of both Israeli and Palestinian signatures in support. He says the “purpose of their 
campaign is to mobilize enough public support for an agreement embodying the principles they 
have outlined to create both the legitimacy and the pressure for decision makers to negotiate such 
an agreement.” (Kelman, 2005, 20) 
The second agreement called the Geneva Accord or Geneva Initiative was prepared by 
Israelis and Palestinians under the auspices of the Swiss government. It is a more detailed 
agreement created by many of the same people who worked on the Oslo Accords. Kelman says 
“The Geneva Accord takes the form of a draft of a permanent status agreement, embodying 
principles very similar to those outlined in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative. The Geneva Accord, 
however, actually spells out the terms of the agreement on most of the key issues—borders, 
Jerusalem, refugees, security, and monitoring arrangements—in great detail, as they might be 
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found in an official treaty.” It is an example of what can happen when “mainstream Israelis and 
Palestinians” have mutual respect and trust for each other. (Kelman, 2005, 21) 
Finally, Kelman believes that “initiatives need to be framed in terms of a principled 
peace [his emphasis] that represents not just the best available deal, but a historic compromise 
that meets the basic needs of both societies, validates the national identity of each people, and 
conforms to the requirements of attainable justice.” The elements of a principled peace include: 
“Acknowledgement of the other’s nationhood and humanity…. Affirmation of the meaning and 
logic of a historic compromise…. A positive vision of a common future….” (Kelman, 2005, 22) 
Leaders from both sides need to create public messages by working together “to make 
sure that these formulations are responsive to the concerns and sensitivities of each side without 
unduly threatening the other side.” (Kelman, 2005, 23) 
Summary  
Kelman applied Burton’s workshops to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Early on, he saw 
the need for both sides to recognize each other’s legitimacy. This was attained in the Oslo 
Accord of 1993. He continued working as the Accord was being implemented, but a change in 
Israeli leadership slowed the implementation and eventually it stopped altogether. Kelman 
focused on affirming the psychological factors that could not only correct misperceptions, but 
also build relationships with which to break the intractability of the conflict and attend to the 
satisfaction of human needs on both sides. The workshop participants also produced a 
“framework” to be used as a guide to negotiations.  
Burton and Kelman’s emphasis on the satisfaction of needs and attention to the 
importance of psychological factors are confirmed in the work of Israeli social psychologist 
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Daniel Bar-Tal. While Bar-Tal is familiar with the work of Burton and Kelman, he is an 
independent source of information concerning intractable conflict.  
Bar-Tal’s Theory of Intractable Conflict  
Israeli social psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal (1946-   ) has studied intractable conflict for 
decades. In his book, Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, he 
places Burton’s “deep-rooted” model in the category of intractable conflict along with the Arab-
Israeli conflict and recognizes the importance of human needs in it. He also reports on surveys 
conducted among Israelis and Palestinians.  
Components  
Human Needs 
Bar-Tal sees human needs as central to this type of conflict. He confirms Burton’s notion 
that deprivation of individual and group needs can lead to intractable conflict. These needs 
include not only physiological but also “self-esteem and self-actualization (e.g., positive social 
identity, or self-determination).” If these needs are deprived, they lead “naturally to setting goals 
with the aim to satisfy them.” He also affirms that individual needs are easily transferable to 
groups: “Although the needs are experienced on an individual level, at least some group 
members may share the same needs and be aware that they experience them because of their 
group membership.” Frustration of these group needs can result in violence: “Among the most 
important collective needs are needs for security, positive identity, equality, justice, freedom, and 
well-being … Deprivation of these needs by another group leads to attempts to change the 
situation by active behavior, including protracted and vicious conflicts …” (Bar-Tal 2013, 65-
66).  
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Characteristics  
Bar-Tal lists seven characteristics as inherent in intractable conflicts. They are: total, 
protracted, violent, perceived as unsolvable, viewed as a zero-sum contest, central, and 
demanding great investments (Bar-Tal 2013, 37). 
Being total, such conflicts are “perceived as being about essential and basic goals, needs, 
or values that are regarded as indispensable for the group’s existence or survival” (Bar-Tal 2013, 
37). Being protracted they have not only “accumulated increasing amounts of prejudice, 
mistrust, hatred, and animosity” but also evolved into “a socio-psychological infrastructure that 
includes collective memory, ethos of conflict, and emotional orientations” (Bar-Tal 2013, 51-
52). Since they are violent, they escalate the conflict and are burned into the society’s collective 
memory: “The collective memory of physical violence serves as a foundation for the 
development of a culture of conflict” (Bar-Tal 2013, 43). Such conflicts are perceived as 
unsolvable for several reasons, including “a long history of failed attempts to achieve a peaceful 
resolution or to subdue the rival party, mutual delegitimizing practices by both sides, the 
resistance of involved societies to changing their conflict’s goals and making compromises, or a 
lack of accommodating leadership” (Bar-Tal 2013, 47-48). Since each side believes it is 
unsolvable, their beliefs “often serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy, because both sides initiate acts 
of violence on the basis of this belief that provide a confirmation to the established belief” (Bar-
Tal 2013, 48). This leads into the zero-sum condition, where the parties perceive “any loss 
suffered by the other side as their own gain, and conversely any gains of the other side as their 
own loss” (Bar-Tal 2013, 44). The conflict becomes central to the lives of the society, so that 
members of society “are involved constantly and continuously with the conflict” (Bar-Tal 2013, 
45). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bar-Tal says that centrality is exhibited in a number of 
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ways, but overall: “Palestinian daily life is continuously affected by the state of the conflict 
(movement from place to place or the ability to work). On the Jewish Israeli side, service in the 
army greatly preoccupies the society members and sets priorities in many of the families” (Bar-
Tal 2013, 46). Finally, both sides typically make large material and psychological investments to 
cope with the conflict. In addition to the material/military investments, psychological 
investments involve “building and imparting the epistemic basis that provides the justification 
for the conflict and the development of the will to maintain the confrontation … An ethos of 
conflict eventually develops that serves as a basis for the development of a culture of conflict” 
(Bar-Tal 2013, 49). These investments are the costs that Burton and Kelman ask workshop 
participants to estimate and consider in their options for action.  
Vested Interests  
Adding to the motivation for conflict caused by unfulfilled needs are the vested interests 
of certain segments of the parties. Such segments include leaders, elites, and ideologues who use 
the conflict for their own purposes. Bar-Tal points to the Israeli settlers who “were able to settle 
in the space of the territory that Palestinians aspired to be their state, and then they got favored 
living conditions from the government to carry out and expand the Jewish settlements … They 
constitute a powerful sector that objects to the compromises needed to settle the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict peacefully” (Bar-Tal 2013, 58). He could just as well point to politicians who 
promote fear and strong security measures to get citizens to vote for them.  
Fear  
Bar-Tal affirms Maslow to say that “all those psychological and social factors that 
increase fear cut impulse to know.” He points to recent social research that confirms that people 
motivated by fear tend to “stick to certain beliefs about the causes of threat, about the conflict, 
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about the adversary, and about ways of coping with the dangers.” They have “difficulty 
entertaining alternative ideas, solutions, or courses of actions” (Bar-Tal 2013, 228).  
Major Information  
A major ongoing problem, seen currently, concerns the public information about the 
conflict or the enemy disseminated by the group’s leaders that can have an important influential 
effect on the views of that society. Bar-Tal cites a pertinent instance: “It is hard to believe that 
Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, who unsuccessfully negotiated with the Palestinian leader 
Yasser Arafat, knew what would be the consequences of his framing the failure of the Camp 
David meeting in the summer of 2000. By providing the major information without any hard 
evidence about ‘exposing’ the motivation of … Arafat to destroy Israel, he greatly influenced the 
severe escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Bar-Tal 2013, 114).   
Positive Factors 
In contrast to these negative factors, Bar-Tal mentions the positive factors of trust, hope, 
and empathy that help deescalate the conflict, and mentions some pertinent studies. 
Trust is one of the most crucial factors because it “denotes lasting expectations about 
future behaviors of the rival group that affect the welfare of one’s own group and allows taking 
risks in various lines of behaviors” (Bar-Tal 2013, 340). A study of Israeli Jews showed that 
“trust toward Palestinians lowers support for violating their human rights.” In another finding: 
“Trust … increased as a result of contact with Palestinians.” To be effective, “trust needs to be 
developed in the initial phases of the peacemaking process, at least by a segment of the society, 
because readiness to carry negotiation toward peaceful resolution of the conflict is by its nature 
risky.” One way that trust can be developed is through “a sequence of carefully calibrated and 
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graduated unilateral initiatives that induce the other side to reciprocate with a tension-reducing 
action, which in turn leads to a sequence of reciprocations” (Bar-Tal 2013, 341).  
Along with trust is the companion psychological factor of hope. In a study in Israel, it 
was found that “the less Jewish participants delegitimized Arabs, the more hope they had of 
peaceful relations with them; in addition, individuals who were less dominated by a central sense 
of Jewish collective memory, which emphasizes persecutions of Jews through centuries, were 
observed to have higher hopes.” Another study in Israel found that “hope was the most powerful 
emotional predictor of Israelis’ support for compromises with the Palestinians” (Bar-Tal 2013, 
342).  
Empathy is also important to peacemaking. He cites a study that found that “empathy felt 
for Palestinian suffering increased the readiness of Israeli Jewish participants toward 
reconciliation.” Another such study found that “empathy felt by Arab children toward Jewish 
children was negatively related to support for violence.” He recognizes that creating empathy is 
an aim of conflict resolution workshops (Bar-Tal 2013, 345).  
Ending the Conflict  
Intractable conflict can be reduced in intensity over time if the societies involved change 
their views or the nature of the conflict changes. But change is required in leadership: “Reduced 
intractability begins when parties (at least the leaders and some segments of the society) begin to 
define the conflict as solvable and begin to negotiate. But the psychological change has to be 
accompanied by reduced violence” (Bar-Tal 2013, 59).  
Summary 
Bar-Tal sees the frustration of human needs as a core problem in intractable conflict. He 
specifies the elements of intractable conflict and their consequences, and provides information 
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on how these factors have been seen in Israeli and Palestinian societies. He recognizes the 
psychological value of building trust, hope, and empathy if the conflict is to be resolved. And he 
sees that a change in leadership might need to take place. Bar-Tal’s studies confirm much of 
what Burton and Kelman have said.  
Outsider Recommendations for Resolution 
There have been numerous suggestions, recommendations, and frameworks submitted for 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The so-called Quartet, comprised of the U.S., Russia, the 
European Union, and the United Nations, has suggested a Roadmap for the parties to follow for 
an agreement. Former President Jimmy Carter is certainly qualified as a negotiator. During his 
presidency, he spent 13 consecutive days at Camp David in 1978 as chief negotiator working 
with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to produce 
the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, certainly an unqualified achievement, probably not to be 
repeated in the foreseeable future (Carter, 1982, p. 319 ff.). Carter has made suggestions for the 
present conflict and recommended the Geneva Initiative as a template (Carter, 2009). Former 
U.S. Senator George Mitchell chaired negotiations for three years in Northern Ireland and 
succeeded in producing the famous Good Friday agreement. He also served as U.S. special 
envoy for the Middle East under President Obama in 2009-2011 attempting, unsuccessfully, to 
produce an agreement. Since then he has published suggestions to use in this conflict (Mitchell, 
2016). Both of these men are certainly aware of the psychodynamics of intractable conflict, but 
their suggestions and the Roadmap do not deal thoroughly with the psychological aspects 
involved, nor with the building of trust and valued relationships. Mitchell does suggest to 
“initiate parallel discussions with Israeli and Palestinian officials to urge that they agree on a 
series of procedural steps that would be intended to counter the paralyzing mistrust that has kept 
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them out of negotiations.” He says that a similar process was successfully used in Northern 
Ireland (Mitchell, 222-223).  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
DISCUSSION 
In our Introduction and Objectives, we set out to accomplish three objectives. The first 
was to explain the conflict resolution method created by John Burton; this has been done. The 
second was to review the results of its application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus far by 
Herbert Kelman; this, too, has been accomplished. What remains is to meet the third objective, 
which is to evaluate this conflict resolution method for the purpose of determining whether it is 
productive to continue its use in this conflict. Before we do that, we might quickly evaluate some 
alternative proposals that have been suggested to resolve the conflict.   
Outsider Recommendations  
The difficulty with outside solutions is that, as Burton pointed out, leaders of sovereign 
states think that they know best the nature of the conflict and how they should respond to it; they 
are the leaders of their nation or community and it is their responsibility to act—no one else’s. 
For outsiders to intervene is considered an insult to their intelligence. Mr. Netanyahu, for 
example, has made it plain that the UN Security Council does not need to tell Israel what to do. 
While he has not made a major point of it publicly, it is fairly certain that he feels the same way 
about the Quartet’s Roadmap, the U.S. suggestions, and any other recommended plans. His 
suggestion is direct talks with the Palestinians, presumably without the use of a mediator (which 
would certainly favor Israel with its military and economic power over the situation).  
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Another concern with the outsider recommendations is that they do not prepare the 
negotiators psychologically for the task of overcoming years of hatred and mistrust. This 
problem has to be settled if work on detailed issues can be completed.  
Since one side or both sides see these recommendations as intervention, it is unlikely 
these recommendations will succeed. 
Insider Recommendations 
If we agree that political leaders may feel justified in rejecting outsider recommendations, 
then what justification do political leaders have for rejecting frameworks or templates of 
agreements, such as the Geneva Initiative, produced by former Israeli and Palestinian officials 
working together?  
Another such proposal has come recently from the Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and 
Labor Party Director General Hilik Bar. Bar is also the Head of the Knesset Committee on the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. He presented his framework for peace with the Palestinians at the 
second annual conference of the Kelman Institute (mentioned below) at Harvard in September, 
2015. He criticizes the Netanyahu cabinet for a lack of vision, leadership, and strategy. He says 
the right-wing Israeli government is trying to simply manage the conflict rather than resolve it, 
and he goes on to present a framework covering all the basic issues 
(http://kelmaninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Hilik-Bar-Mid-East-Seminar-and-Peace-
Plan.pdf). But he offers little in the way of resolving the lack of trust and valued relationships in 
intractable conflicts. 
With the kind of criticism Bar presents, it is expected that Netanyahu will reject this 
proposal too even though it comes from inside the Israeli government. There is the matter of 
partisan politics, and in this case, a matter of keeping one’s coalition together and retaining 
58 
 
power. For Mr. Netanyahu to agree to consider either the Bar proposal or the Geneva Initiative 
and discuss them with Mr. Abbas would be implying that other Israeli parties were able to handle 
the challenge and he was not—again an example of a leader determining that only he has the 
answers. (Note: An email sent by this author in December, 2016, to Netanyahu’s office asking 
why he has not taken up the Geneva Initiative has yet to receive a response.) 
It’s hard to say what Mr. Netanyahu’s peace proposal is. A 2015 news report says that 
during his second government (2009-2013), Netanyahu offered a proposal to the Palestinians that 
made drastic concessions. But Netanyahu’s current administration says that proposal was never 
offered; any such proposal was probably the creation of the U.S. 
(http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4634075,00.html Accessed 2-21-17). 
And earlier this year, a news report said that at a secret meeting held in February, 2016, 
in the Jordanian city of Aqaba, Netanyahu turned down a proposal that, among other things, had 
Arab nations recognizing Israel as a Jewish state in return for the pullout of the IDF from all the 
territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Sources reported that Netanyahu said he could not get 
such a proposal approved by his coalition (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
4634075,00.html Accessed 2-21-17).  
This suggests another possibility that could offer a chance for peace negotiations: 
building a new coalition with the inclusion of more moderate parties. This was considered a 
possibility immediately after the 2015 elections. Allegedly, Netanyahu offered a unity 
government coalition with Issac Herzog, the Labor Party leader. That party had merged with the 
moderate Hatnua Party to run under the name of The Zionist Union. In the election, Likud won 
30 seats, and The Zionist Union won 24, meaning that they would need only 7 more seats to 
form a majority coalition. However, Herzog refused, and Netanyahu went on to form his 
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coalition with smaller, more radical parties 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/25/israel-coalition-deal-hard-right-government-
avigdor-lieberman  Accessed 12-12-16). The fact that Netanyahu offered that opportunity to 
Herzog suggests, however slightly, that Netanyahu might have been open to compromises in 
regard to negotiations with the Palestinians.  
The Value of the Burton Method 
The major obstacles in intractable conflicts are emotional and psychological, so persons 
trained in psychology are needed to offer guidance. The conflict resolution workshops provide 
attention to these matters. The third-party panel includes psychologists. And one of the first 
orders of business is to review and correct perceptions by each side. This exercise alone has an 
impact on the psychological mindsets of the parties, helping them to modify their view of the 
other side as the enemy. Understanding starts to build when they realize that they experience the 
same kinds of pressures and constraints, such that if they were suddenly put on the other side of 
the conflict, they would probably behave like the adversary. Cooperation begins when each side 
becomes aware that they have common unmet needs that, working together, can be satisfied for 
the benefit of all. They learn about the process of communication, rather than negotiate the 
individual issues. Through the building of trust, participants come to believe that there is a 
negotiating partner on the other side.  
Since the method is sequentially pre-negotiation, it does not address each specific issue of 
the conflict, but instead builds the psychological and analytical bases to produce a framework 
with which to inspire and guide the negotiators who do tackle the specific issues. 
The third-party panel of experts guides the discussions and provides a variety of 
knowledge and experience about conflict. This is different from mediation—it does not depend 
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upon a mediator to offer suggestions on how to solve a problem. Only the parties, after analysis, 
can offer suggestions and decide on them. This is key to each side’s insistence to solve their own 
problems.   
Kelman’s Work 
Kelman’s IPS workshops that have been held with Israeli and Palestinian participants 
since the 1970s, are generally thought to have moderated the thoughts and emotions about this 
intractable conflict among the community of influential persons. While Kelman’s work with 
representatives from both sides did not directly produce the Oslo Accord, it seems fair to say 
that: 1) the qualities that were exhibited by negotiators in the creation of the Oslo Accord, i.e., 
the mutual respect and trust of the parties, are the same kind of qualities that his workshops strive 
to generate in its participants; and 2) the qualities promoted by his workshops have been 
dispersed among the community of persons who have the ability to produce a just and permanent 
agreement; and 3) these qualities are also of the kind that have been responsible for the creation 
of the Geneva Initiative of 2003. It might also be said that the reason for the failure of the Oslo 
Accord was that more persons, especially political leaders, did not participate in workshops such 
as Kelman offered. 
The workshops provide a standard in the form of the satisfaction of basic human needs so 
that the participants are aware of this important goal. This knowledge is conveyed to the 
negotiators, or the workshop participants can do the negotiating. During negotiations, there will 
still be interests that must be settled through compromise, and there may still be the urge to walk 
out of negotiations when things are getting tough; but the parties will know that they are doing 
vital work from which both sides will benefit, and they must complete it. 
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The process is a human and ethical approach, i.e., it promotes a method that does not 
harm anyone or cast judgment on them. It assumes that both sides are doing what they think they 
must do to protect themselves. It seeks to improve the conduct of relations between the parties to 
deescalate the conflict. Its aim is to improve the lives of both sides. 
The IPS workshop qualities produced, plus the positive survey results reported by Bar-
Tal, offer hope by demonstrating that there is a continuing potential for agreement. Perhaps 
future generations who are not imbued with the history of victimhood will decide that this 
conflict has gone on too long and put an end to it. One might even surmise that the peace process 
could have been completed by now except but for the lack of trust of certain leaders. 
Conclusion 
Our conclusion is that the IPS workshop is an effective, positive, and ethical method to 
help resolve this and other intractable conflicts. It should be supported for continued use in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and elsewhere. This conclusion accomplishes our third objective. 
Even if an enlightened Israeli leadership were to embrace the Geneva Initiative, our 
recommendation is that the IPS workshops should continue, since they are a problem-solving and 
moderating force. As Burton implies, simply because an agreement is signed does not mean that 
conflict will stop; a new set of conflicts can emerge, especially as new leaders are elected, so a 
means of resolving each one will be needed. 
The IPS workshop method offers the prospect of resolving conflict in a variety of 
situations, not just international or intercommunal conflict. It can be used to assess public policy, 
to negotiate with urban gangs, to handle labor-management relations—in any situation where 
human needs and values are in conflict. 
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The IPS workshop method or some appropriate form of it should be taught in all schools 
at a point where the students can understand its goals. This would help to bring about a more 
peaceful society and world. 
Further thoughts are now offered for the use of workshops in this conflict.  
Further Thoughts  
Intra-Party Conflict and Use of the Method 
Two of Burton’s observations in conflict resolution were, first, that assumptions should 
not be made regarding the uniformity of views within each opposing party. In fact, the norm is 
that there is intraparty internal disunity. The existence of “sub-disputes” within each side can 
hamper or prevent an agreement. Another Burton insight is that all parties directly affected by 
the conflict should be involved in pre-negotiations and negotiations.  
Both of these insights are applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The failure of the 
1993 Oslo Accords was largely the result of acts by those who, within each side, held different 
views from the negotiators and were not parties to its process. On the Palestinian side, the failure 
is attributed to the violence of Hamas, who refused to recognize the agreement. On the Israeli 
side, obstruction of the agreement can be attributed to the objections of the extreme right-wing 
parties that are said to have been responsible for the killing, by an Israeli settler, of 29 
Palestinians praying in a mosque in February, 1994 and the November, 1995 assassination, by an 
ultra-orthodox student, of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who approved the Accords 
(Bickerton and Klausner 2015, 304). Once extremist Israeli parties become part of any ruling 
coalition, as they are presently, they can make demands for more settlement building in the 
Palestinian West Bank, thus jeopardizing the peace process. There are, therefore, extremists on 
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both sides that can hinder an agreement. The conflict might even be said to be a “war of 
extremists.” They should be included in the workshops.  
Hamas and Fatah 
Since the workshop process can be used to negotiate resolutions to intra-party conflicts, it 
seems appropriate to urge the leaders of the Hamas and Fatah political parties to participate in an 
IPS workshop to resolve differences that currently prevent unification of the Palestinian 
government.  
The on-again off-again Hamas-Fatah unity government problem impedes the peace 
process and Palestinian political development. The sticking point seems to be control of the 
various Palestinian security forces (http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/fatah-hamas-
reconciliation. Accessed 2-14-17). Initially, it might be thought that this is an interest in 
controlling power and is not subject to debate over human needs. But underlying the power-
security question appears to be yet another issue of distrust in regard to one’s own physical 
security and esteem, which are human needs. This is an example of the kind of admission that 
might be revealed in the discussions of perceptions and analysis in an IPS workshop. Creative 
problem-solving could be used to find options on how to design the control of security groups so 
that no leader feels threatened by another’s security forces. If such issues could be resolved, then 
a stable unified front could be formed with which to enter negotiations with Israel.  
If unity can be achieved, regardless of resistance from Israel or the U.S., the Palestinian 
side would be better represented and more stable in any negotiations. It could help to unify the 
Palestinian people so that violence by the Hamas militant wing would be discouraged. There is 
little doubt that many members of the international community would support the workshop 
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because it would offer the probability of a reduction in both the internecine warfare within the 
Palestinian camp and the “terrorist” activities against Israelis.  
Israeli Extremists 
On the Israeli side, the question is more complicated. Working with religious extremists 
would seem to be particularly difficult if their demands are based on religious documents that are 
thousands of years old. As Burton implies, such demands can be considered religious values that 
overlay human needs. Kelman has suggested that it might be possible to probe into these values 
to determine if there are unsatisfied needs, such as religious security, that could be attended to in 
order to reduce their demands for such things as Palestinian land. If their basic needs could be 
satisfied, any residual interests might be open to compromise, such as making changes to Israeli 
laws so that religious groups do not have to serve in the IDF (an ongoing issue).  
This leaves the question about who these religious parties would participate with in any 
IPS workshop. The Likud Party would not seem to be motivated to participate since it currently 
has the ruling coalition and presumably wants to keep the structure the way it is. And it is 
doubtful that the extremist parties would participate with moderate Israeli political parties who 
are not in power. An option then might be to include them in a workshop along with the top 
leaders.  
Top Israeli and Palestinian Leaders  
It can be a challenge for workshop participants to convince their top leaders to be 
flexible. It is a long, arduous process trying to change the minds of persons who have been 
steeped in ideologies of victimhood and the use of military power to solve problems. That’s why 
Burton suggests having the top political leaders go through the workshop and why Kelman 
suggests repeating the workshops, if necessary, with the same participants.  
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Since some of the benefits sought in the workshops are to generate respect and trust 
between the sides, to understand the vital importance of the satisfaction of basic human needs, 
and to stop violent and intractable conflict, it seems essential to urge the Israeli and Palestinian 
top leaders to participate in a workshop. (This would be done after Palestinian unity had been 
achieved.) The leaders should be urged, even pressured, by the U.S. and the international 
community to participate in secret IPS workshops. If having the top leaders attend proved to be 
pragmatically unworkable because of other pressing issues, then officials close to the top leaders 
could be substituted.  
Leaders may resist participation by claiming that they are being forced into negotiating 
when they do not want to be. The answer to this excuse is that the process is not negotiations but 
pre-negotiations, and they would not be committing themselves to new policies. They may 
further resist by claiming that media leaks would be detrimental to their positions because the 
public could get the impression that the leaders are weak and are making unnecessary 
concessions. But the sessions would be held in secret at a time and place not made available to 
anyone outside the small group of participants.  
The pressure of the U.S. and the international community for such participation would be 
necessary in cases of refusal. It would be made clear to both leaders that anything less than full 
participation would have negative consequences, including restrictions on or loss of military 
and/or economic aid, not only from the U.S. but the international community. 
As mentioned above, Kelman has pointed out that Secretary of State James Baker and 
President George H. W. Bush held back loan guarantees in 1992 to successfully pressure Yitzhak 
Shamir to stop building settlements in the West Bank and begin negotiations. Saadia Touval also 
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reports that Henry Kissinger held up aid to Israel in 1975 to get it to agree to concessions in what 
resulted as the Sinai II treaty (Touval, 241).  
However, it must be admitted that currently such pressure tactics have little chance of 
even being considered. With the stranglehold on Congress by the American Jewish lobby and the 
election of a U.S. president who has expressed almost obeisant support of Israel, other members 
of the international community, some of whom have already shown strong support for 
Palestinian causes, would have to step up. One example of this support is the December, 2016, 
UN Security Council Resolution 2334 condemning Israel’s building of settlements in the West 
Bank—a resolution approved by a 14-0 vote that was passed with the abstention of the U.S. 
Another example is the meeting of some 70 nations in France in January, 2017, to demand a 
cessation of settlement building and a two-state resolution of this conflict. 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/middleeast/missing-at-israel-palestinian-peace-
conference-israelis-or-palestinians.html?_r=0 Accessed 2-7-17). And in August, 2016, it was 
announced that Russia was willing to host direct negotiations between Israel and Palestine 
(http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4844610,00.html accessed 1-18-17). Such support 
could be motivated by, among other things, Israel’s recalcitrance being seen as a factor in the 
recruiting of Islamist militants, which affects the international community. 
Israeli Cabinet and Creators of the Geneva Initiative 
One last consideration in the application of the IPS workshop is to use it for a discussion 
between the Israeli cabinet and the creators of the Geneva Initiative. The cabinet is currently 
made up of several ultra-religious parties and an ultra-nationalist party. Still, the hope is that 
within these parties there is a variety of thoughts about resolving the conflict.  
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An example might be that of Naftali Bennett, leader of the right-wing The Jewish Home 
party and Minister of Education in Netanyahu’s current coalition. His November, 2014, op-ed 
piece in The New York Times, although obviously written to influence opinion of Americans who 
are not well informed about the conflict, did offer a four-step approach to increase Palestinian 
autonomy in parts of the West Bank and improve the economic conditions there. It did not, 
however, address the main problems of meeting the psychological needs of the Palestinians for 
recognition and their own state (Bennett 2014). Participation in a workshop could expose the 
ideas of people like Bennett to analysis in the light of new learning.  
Human Needs 
It is certainly intuitive that any living thing has needs that must be satisfied if that living 
thing is to survive. Burton’s focus on human needs makes us aware of the characteristics of 
human nature that explain much conflict and confusion in the world. If human needs are not met, 
conflict, deviance, and crime can result. For example, if one is starving, one will have a tendency 
to get food in any way possible, especially if one’s family is involved; theft is not only possible, 
but probable. If one’s affection need is unsatisfied, one will attempt to find affection, or what 
passes for affection, anywhere. Since sex is associated with affection, one may resort to illegal 
sexual activities seeking to fulfill that affection need. If one is denied the satisfaction of the 
esteem need, one may resort to joining a gang to fill that need. If one is unable to find a 
satisfactory job to help satisfy the need for economic security, one may resort to crime. The 
satisfaction of needs may even take a form that is seemingly unrelated to a particular need, such 
as eating excessively to fill a frustrated need for affection or peer approval. So the study of 
human needs can help not only in resolving conflict but also in creating public policies to design 
a more fulfilling society; the latter practice is what Burton terms “provention.”  
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Israelis and Palestinians both have human needs to be met, the most apparent being for 
security and stability, as well as identity and recognition. For the Palestinians, in many cases, 
even physiological needs for food, water, and shelter are not being met. This lack of satisfaction 
of their basic human needs has played a part in the frustration of some Palestinians. But so has 
the lack of satisfaction of the need for security for Israelis. Since the Israelis have the 
overwhelming military power, there is the tendency on their part, as Maslow and Burton 
describe, to assume dominating roles. With this vast military power, the question arises as to why 
Israel continues to feel so insecure.  
Since security, recognition, and identity are basic human needs, and the act of military 
occupation prevents the fulfillment of those human needs, and since the frustration of unfulfilled 
human needs will most probably result in, by those denied, actions which may produce violent 
and intractable conflict, it appears that if the government of Israel cannot reach a peace 
agreement with the Palestinians, it can look forward to future costs of sporadic violence from the 
Palestinians, attacks from outside jihadist groups, attacks on Jews outside of Israel, and even to 
international disapprobation and sanction. So even with overwhelming military power, Israel can 
feel insecure. This is an example of the frustration of one peoples’ needs affecting the frustration 
of another peoples’ needs.  
Burton’s emphasis on valued relationships as a safeguard against conflict makes us aware 
of this missing element in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The work of the third-party panel to 
control communication and engage in mutual problem-solving is critical to building trust and 
valued relationships.  If the parties trust each other, conflict resolution can occur; without trust, 
as we observe in the present situation, resolution is not possible. Can we dare to imagine what 
would happen if Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas had a valued relationship?  
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Serious conflict seems to be on the rise in the world and in this country. Perhaps it is time 
to act on Burton’s recommendation that conflict resolution becomes institutionalized and part of 
our political philosophy. 
Some Available Resources 
If the parties to a conflict wish to avail themselves of the workshop, how would they do 
it?  
a. Professor Kelman turns 90 years of age in March, 2017, and is retired from active 
workshop activity. However, his heritage includes the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive 
Conflict Transformation located in Vienna, Austria. Its website describes itself as “engaged in 
civil society conflict transformation and peacebuilding in international and intra-societal 
conflicts. The objectives are to foster peace through violence prevention, peace mediation and 
historic reconciliation” (http://kelmaninstitute.org/who-we-are/mission/ accessed 1-18-17). The 
Institute currently has a project to foster an ongoing intra-group dialogue about the Holy 
Esplanade in Jerusalem. The Institute will present its third conference on intractable conflict at 
Harvard University from March 16-18, 2017. One of the sessions will cover the resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the public is not invited. The Institute is also currently 
working on building an international network, including an American affiliate (email response 
from Wilfried Graf, Co-Director of the Institute, 2-18-17). Since the group continues the work of 
Kelman, support by all is highly recommended. 
b. A cursory search finds two other organizations that appear to do similar work. The first 
is the Mercy Corps Conflict Management Group, which is the result of the merger of Mercy 
Corps and the Conflict Management Group (CMG). The former is primarily a short-term 
material aid relief agency while the latter focuses on conflict management. CMG was founded in 
70 
 
1984 by noted negotiation expert Roger Fisher, author of the book, Getting to Yes. (Fisher died 
in 2012.) The agency describes itself as having “close ties to Harvard University [where Kelman 
worked] and a reputation for innovative peace-building work in troubled regions worldwide…. 
CMG is an intellectual leader in conflict resolution with a track record of taking on the toughest 
peace challenges, from Northern Ireland to the Korean peninsula. CMG has a staff of conflict 
management experts whose work often involves facilitating negotiations in conflict-affected 
countries” (https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/united-states/mercy-corps-conflict-
management-group accessed 1-12-17). 
c. The other group is Search for Common Ground which describes its mission as: 
“Instead of tearing down an existing world, we focus on constructing a new one. We do this 
through a type of peacebuilding called conflict transformation. Meaning: we look to change the 
everyday interactions between groups of people in conflict, so they can work together to build up 
their community, choosing joint problem-solving over violence.” This group is currently 
involved in a project in Israel: “From our office in Jerusalem, we’re working to bridge the gap 
between Israelis and Palestinians through leadership development, multimedia, interfaith, and 
health projects” (https://www.sfcg.org/the-need/ accessed 1-12-17). 
Hope for the Future  
A number of civic and religious organizations, too numerous to mention, are engaged in 
cross-cultural activities designed to increase friendly relations between Israelis and Palestinians. 
Many Jewish organizations, American and non-American, fully support the Geneva Initiative 
(http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/supporters-worldwide accessed 2-7-17). 
There is hope that future, younger leaders on both sides will decide to stop this 
destruction of people and resources and come to an agreement. Perhaps it will take several 
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generations of those who were born after the Holocaust and are not imbued with the ideology of 
victimhood.  
Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas have a rare opportunity in this era of world history. They 
can make use of it to demonstrate to the world a better way of resolving conflict and thereby 
uplift civilization, or they can follow the traditional path of violence to retard civilization. A 
critic might say that responsibility for every person who is injured or killed while there is no 
peace agreement falls on the shoulders of the leaders. They have the opportunity to avoid that 
criticism.  
In a recent interview, Kelman was asked to complete the statement that begins “The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be solved if…” He responded with “there would be some 
charismatic leadership, and creative problem solving” (Kelman 2009). So in conflict, like so 
many other things, leadership determines whether peace will prevail.  
Summary of Points 
 
Thesis: The conflict resolution method developed by John Burton and used by Herbert Kelman 
is an appropriate method to use on the Israeli-Palestinian intractable conflict.  
1. All the outsider (and insider) recommendations deal with specific issues or provide a 
framework with which to guide negotiations. The political leaders involved in the conflict 
think that they know better than any outsider the issues involved and what they feel is 
needed to resolve them; they deem it insulting to be told how to settle the issues. 
2. The outsider/insider recommendations do not prepare the negotiators psychologically for 
the task of overcoming years of hatred and distrust. This problem has to be settled before 
the detailed issues can be resolved.  
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3. The Burton-Kelman IPS workshop method provides what is needed to resolve intractable 
conflict. The process guides participants to change their perceptions of the enemy and 
understand his situation better, thus providing an improved atmosphere for cooperation. 
If the political leaders refuse to participate in the workshops or some similar type of 
process, chances are that the intractable conflict will not be resolved.  
4. The IPS workshops provide a standard by which to assess negotiations and actions in the 
form of the theory of human needs. By focusing on human needs while analyzing and 
creating solutions, there is a much greater chance that a just and permanent agreement 
will be achieved.  
5. The IPS workshop method is humane and ethical. It assumes that both sides are doing 
what they think they must do to protect themselves. It does not harm or humiliate anyone 
or cast judgment on them.  
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